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“Only two groups of people deny that organization matters: economists and everybody
else”
James Quinn Wilson
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Corporate political activity (CPA) is commonly defined as the deliberate attempts
undertaken to shape government policy and process in ways that are favourable to
firms (Hillman et al., 2004). Recent studies (Frynas et al. 2017; Lux et al., 2011;
Lawton et al., 2013, 2014; Mellahi et al., 2016; Puck et al., 2018) highlight the
relevance of CPA for practitioners and scholars of strategic management. CPA
provides a set of strategic actions that firms can pursue for monitoring and
influencing political environments to maximise economic returns from the political
environment (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). Firms use CPA to better understand
government policies, which have potential to generate a relevant impact for their
business operations by affecting their cost structure, demand conditions or increasing
the complexity of their competitive landscape (Lawton et al. 2013). Apart from these
inward-facing monitoring based activities, CPA is also used to perform outward-
facing representational activities, aimed at influencing the regulatory political
environment.
A rich corpus of scholarship has emerged to study different types of CPA (e.g. De
Villa et al., 2019), their firm-, industry- and institutional-level antecedents (e.g.
Banerjee and Venaik, 2018), and consequences for firm performance (e.g. Rajwani
and Liedong, 2015). Despite these studies, our theoretical and practical
understandings of many dimensions of CPA remain underdeveloped (Mellahi et al.,
2016; Puck et al., 2018). Organisational-level antecedents of CPA remain especially
understudied (Lux et al., 2011; Lawton et al., 2013; Puck et al., 2018). We still have
surprisingly little scholarly or practical knowledge about how firms can manage and
organise their CPA functions effectively at a more micro level. This thesis seeks to
explore further this specific aspect of CPA.
In addressing this research gap, the focus of this thesis is on the specific
organisational unit which is in charge with formulating and implementing CPA,
namely, the government affairs (GA) unit. Furthermore, this thesis relies on previous
studies, which have recognized that, within firms, these GA units can be organized as
boundary-spanning functions (Adams, 1976; Aldrich and Herker, 1977; Post et
al.1982; Meznar and Nigh, 1995). Specifically, these studies see GA units acting as a
‘window out’ of the firm, supporting the activities of the firm in the external political
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environment through influence-based activities, by providing external political actors
with relevant and detailed information about their firms’ internal information and
objectives; while also acting as a ‘window in’ to the firm, GA units monitor the
external political environment and bring into the firm relevant information that could
have important implications for internal business divisions.
Therefore, in line with previous scholars (e.g. Coen and Vannoni, 2020), we view
CPA essentially as an information processing activity. Consequently, this thesis
applies insights from organisation design theory (Burton and Obel, 2004; Galbraith,
1995), which is rooted in the information processing perspective (e.g. Galbraith,
1974; Thompson, 1967; Tushman and Nadler, 1978). The information processing
view contends that organisation design involves the need for firms to balance
information processing capacity with information processing demands (e.g. Galbraith,
1974). Organisation design theory is thus a normative approach that helps managers
purposefully configure their firms’ units so that their information processing
capacities meet their information processing requirements (Burton and Obel, 2018).
Drawing on these above-mentioned views, this thesis aims at answering the
following overarching research question:
How can firms purposefully organise their boundary-spanning CPA
units in ways that enable them to acquire and disseminate information
to internal business units and external policymaking bodies effectively?
As discussed in more detail below, it explores this question through conceptual and
empirical exploratory inquiries. In the empirical studies, this thesis explores the
research question by adopting the case study methodology. CPA scholars (e.g.
Boddewyn 2007) have been advocating for more case study research into CPA, so
that the ‘black box’ of corporate political strategizing can be prized open.
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The body of this thesis is formed by a compendium of three publications. The author
has contributed in the different research phases of these three publications, such as
conceptually framing the studies and formulating their relevant research question,
data collection and analysis, and finally presenting and discussing their research
findings. The body of this thesis is structured as follows.
The first article aims to extend understandings of organising CPA in multinational
enterprises (MNEs). It explores how the social capital of government affairs
managers (GAMs), and in turn the political performance of the government affairs
(GA) subsidiaries in which they work, is affected by the organisational design of
these units. This study conducts a comparative case analysis between two cases:
Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC) and Hyundai Motor Company (HMC) in Europe.
These two cases represent contrasting cases of CPA performance (Yin, 2013). Data
in this study draws from semi-structured interviews with informants possessing
direct experience of the development of Toyota and Hyundai’s external political
relationships in Brussels and in these two companies’ annual reports. This chapter’s
results suggest that GAMs working in relatively decentralised and coordinated GA
subsidiaries have higher levels of internal and external social capital, and
consequently can be more influential compared to GAMs working for relatively
centralised and loosely-coordinated GA subsidiaries.
While the first article explores the organisational antecedents of CPA performance,
focusing on influencing activities, the second article focuses attention on exploring
specifically how firms can organise their GA boundary-spanning units to increase
their monitoring information-processing performance, i.e. to increase their capacity
to capture external information and share it with another internal business division.
Specifically it explores the following research question: how can firms organise their
CPA units to capture external political information and communicate it with relevant
internal business divisions? To explore this research question, this chapter follows a
single case study methodology focusing on the UK-based GA unit of a large
manufacturing firm. The study drew on semi-structured interviews with informants
performing boundary spanning roles working in this GA unit and their colleagues in
one the firm’s business division. Mobilising insights from organisational design
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theory, chapter 3 shows that changes in the autonomy, specialisation and formal
coordination of the firm’s UK-based GA unit have over time positively affected its
information processing activities. Interestingly, this study shows that the GA unit has
been able to source political information more proactively as its specialisation and
autonomy have increased. Its ability to share this information inside the firm has
improved as it has become more integrated in the business through formal
coordination mechanisms.
Whilst chapters 2 and 3 focus respectively on the influencing and monitoring
activities of firms, chapter 4 recognises that firms often perform these two actions in
tandem, rather than in mutual exclusion. Conceived as a conceptual and practice-
focused paper, it explores how firms can design their government affairs (GAs) units
in ways that improve their ability simultaneously to monitor and influence legislative
developments in their firms’ corporate political environments. Informed by existing
research into organizational design, brought to life with illustrative examples of
firms’ political actions derived from interviews conducted with practitioners in the
field, it argues that high-performing GA units need to be designed and built using a
blend of mutually reinforcing organisational mechanisms. GA units should be staffed
by autonomous managers with mixed skills-sets. Moreover, they should not be
constrained by formal rules, but instead given autonomy and support to create lateral
relations with other business units. The study provides a “recipe” that managers can
follow to create opportunities for the exchange of political information within their
firms and enable and motivate GA practitioners to monitor and influence political
developments more effectively.
In the remainder of the thesis, each of the three articles is presented, followed by a
general conclusion of their findings.
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This paper aims to extend understandings of the corporate political activity (CPA) of
multinational enterprises (MNEs). It explores how the social capital of government
affairs managers (GAMs), and in turn the political performance of the government
affairs (GA) subsidiaries in which they work, is affected by their MNE’s
organisational design. Our empirical focus is the GA subsidiaries of Toyota Motor
Corporation (TMC) and Hyundai Motor Company (HMC) in Brussels. Our
comparative case-study research suggests that GAMs working in relatively
decentralised and coordinated GA subsidiaries have higher levels of internal and
external social capital, and consequently can be more influential compared to GAMs
working for relatively centralised and loosely-coordinated GA subsidiaries. Our
findings respond to calls for more research providing managers with practical
guidance on how to organise their international GA functions more effectively. They
also contribute to CPA scholarship by specifying and explicating individual- and
organisational-level antecedents of CPA that remain understudied in the current
literature.
2.1 Introduction
“Hyundai’s lobbying activities in Brussels are not as active or developed as, say,
Toyota’s, even though their lobbyists have access to the same networks” (Author
interview with Industry Expert, January 2015).
Corporate political activity (CPA) relates to deliberate attempts to shape government
policy and process in ways favourable to firms (Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004).
Firms pursue political actions to improve their performance (Schuler, Rehbein and
Cramer, 2002). CPA can open doors to political decision-makers (Keim and
Zeithamel, 1986) and enable firms to influence their political environments (Capron
and Chatain, 2008; McWilliams, van Fleet, and Cory, 2002). MNEs engage in CPA
to reduce exposure to risk (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003; Keillor, Wilkinson and Owens,
2005), especially in countries with weak regulatory regimes (Khanna and Palepu,
2000; Henisz and Zelner, 2010). CPA can be a source of value creation for firms
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operating both nationally and internationally (Bonardi, Hoburn and Van den Bergh,
2006; Getz, 1997; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Keillor and Hult, 2004).
Scholars have mobilised different theoretical mechanisms to explain CPA
performance. One mechanism is social capital (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). This
relates to the resources that individuals or collectives accrue through social
structures or networks of relationships (Lin, 2001). Oliver and Holzinger (2008: 505)
view ‘political social capital’ as a resource mobilised by firms to exert influence
over external policy actors and defend market positions. Inspired by Granovetter
(1985), some scholars examine how political embeddedness (i.e. the bureaucratic,
instrumental, or affective ties of MNEs to state actors) impacts on organisational
performance (Sun, Mellahi and Thun, 2010). Others mobilise networking,
reciprocity and social exchange theories to discuss relations with government
regulators and the development of trust between firms and policy makers (Gillespie,
Dietz and Lockey, 2014; Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi and Cannella, 2008). Extant
research assumes that firms’ linkages with external policy makers lead to political
leverage if they are relational in character (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), that is
characterised by trust and openness (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Inkpen and Tsang,
2005).
Although prior research recognises the role played by social capital in CPA, some
intriguing questions remain. Existing scholarship pays little attention to mechanisms
that condition the social capital of individual Government Affairs Managers (GAMs)
in MNEs. These are important boundary spanners, charged with linking internal
MNE networks with external political networks (Post, Murray and Dickie, 1982). To
our knowledge, no CPA scholars have examined the antecedents of GAMs’ social
capital in the political arena. Adopting an outcomes-focused perspective to examine
the causal link between a firm’s social capital and its overall political performance is
clearly important. However, we consider it equally important to identify
determinants of individual GAMs’ social capital, explore how these may change
over time, and consider how such changes may temporally affect the performance of
MNEs’ politically active subsidiaries. After all, managers cannot effectively utilise
the information that social capital is conducive to increasing political influence
unless they have clear indications of how social capital can actually be promoted.
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We provide such indications through comparative case-study research focused on
the GAMs involved in developing the government affairs (GA) subsidiaries of
Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC) and Hyundai Motor Company (HMC) in Europe.
These organisations provide interesting comparative cases because, despite both
MNEs being non-European and having similar manufacturing volumes and market
shares in Europe (OICA, 2015a and 2015b), their GA subsidiaries have achieved
different levels of political performance in Brussels. Through these case studies, our
research aims to explore how the social capital of locally-recruited GAMs, and in
turn the political performance of the subsidiaries in which they work, is affected by
their MNE’s organisational design.
To manage their relationships with geographically dispersed subsidiaries (including
their GA subsidiaries) multinationals like TMC and HMC can use decentralisation
and coordination mechanisms (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Ghoshal and Nohria,
1993). We adopted a multi-level theoretical perspective to explore the impact of
these two MNE-level mechanisms on GAMs’ social capital and, in turn, re-
examined the impact of GAMs’ social capital on the performance of their Brussel-
based GA subsidiaries. We undertook our research from the perspective of European
GAMs. In line with Luo (2003), we consider it important for headquarter managers
to understand the views of local managers on organisation design and structure and
how they affect relationship building.
Our findings confirm existing research suggesting that social capital has a positive
impact on the political performance of firms. However, these findings are secondary
to our analysis of the role played by the organisational design of MNEs in the
creation of GAMs’ social capital. GAMs’ attempts at building and maintaining
external relationships with policy actors are affected by their relationships with
internal colleagues. This ‘internal’ social capital of GAMs is in itself influenced by
the organisational design of their respective MNEs.
These key findings provide practitioners with guidance on how to organise their
corporate political actions more effectively. Our research responds to calls for more
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knowledge on how firms can potentially improve their political actions through
managerial interventions (Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004). We also contribute to
emerging CPA scholarship, which attempts to capture the organisational
complexities facing the GA employees of MNEs (Boddewyn, 2007; Dieleman and
Boddewyn, 2012; Sun, Mellahi and Wright, 2012).
Importantly, we also shift attention away from aggregated proxies of firm-level
activities to the individuals or groups who are the likely origin of political advantage
(Lawton, Rajwani and Doh, 2013). Differentiating ourselves from extant CPA
research which tends to neglect the individual-level antecedents of CPA (Mellahi,
Frynas, Sun and Siegel, 2016), we essentially unpack and explain the political
actions of MNEs at a more complex and individual level (e.g. Baer, Dirks and
Nickerson, 2013; Foss and Pedersen, 2014). We decompose the political actions of
firms into the actions and interactions of GAMs with their internal colleagues and
external policy actors.
In making these contributions, we structure our paper as follows. We begin by
establishing the theoretical foundations that underpinned our study. Next we
describe our research context and methods for collecting and analysing data. Then,
we present our findings and discuss how they contribute to existing research. Finally,
we conclude by establishing the limitations of our study and highlighting fruitful
avenues for future research.
2.2 Theoretical and contextual background
2.2.1 Social capital
Social capital relates to the goodwill available to individuals or groups whose source
lies in the structure and content of actors’ social relations (Adler and Kwon, 2002).
It is a construct that can be reflected by three specific dimensions: structural,
relational, and cognitive (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The structural dimension
encompasses actors in a network and the constellation of links amongst them. It
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captures the density and connectivity of the network, and the frequency of
interactions of actors within it. Ties between actors in the network can be classified
as either strong (i.e. close and frequent) or weak (i.e. distant and infrequent)
(Granovetter, 1985).
The relational dimension of social capital complements the structural dimension by
emphasising the qualitative dimensions of interactions. It is concerned with trust,
which can impact on the outcomes of interpersonal, intra-organisational and inter-
organisational cooperation (Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007). The cognitive
dimension of social capital has attracted less research interest (Nahapiet and
Ghoshal, 1998). This relates to shared mental modes that facilitate effective
collaboration (Cohen and Prusak, 2001). It is concerned with understanding how, for
example, a shared context or common language eases interactions. The cognitive
dimensions emphasises the extent to which values and norms are shared across
members of an organisation, or collaborating organisations.
Social capital and its effects can be studied at different levels of analysis. Some
scholars focus primarily on the organisation-level of analysis, and investigate how
the configuration, management and evolution of social capital can affect
organisational performance (Pennings and Lee, 1999). Others engage specifically
with social capital at the individual level, and emphasise individuals’ accrued social
assets such as prestige, educational credentials and social clubs (e.g., Belliveau,
O’Reilly, and Wade, 1996, Burt, 1992, 1997). Still others view the social capital of
firms as the compound of the social capital of individual organisational members
(Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). There remains, however, a lack of micro-level research
that investigates how individual-level social capital is linked with organisation-level
social capital and organisation-level outcomes (Ibarra, Kilduff and Tsai, 2005).
2.2.2 Organisation design
Firms are usually organised by function, products and customers resulting in
complex multidimensional organisational structures. As firms expand
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geographically, the complexity of their environments increase, leading to further
complexity in how they are structured (Ghoshal and Nohria, 1993; Kates and
Galbraith, 2010). This has led to multiple classifications within the international
management literature. Stopford and Wells (1972) proposed a model defining four
MNE structural forms – internal division, area division, worldwide product division
and global matrix. The fitness of each structural form is contingent upon the
environmental characteristics of the MNE (ibid). Following the same logic, Daniels,
Pitts and Tretter (1984) argued that there are five structural alternatives – worldwide
product, worldwide function, area, international division and matrix.
Organisational design refers not only to structural considerations that describe how
the division of labour is designed (i.e. allocation of formal power and authority,
departmentalisation or grouping criteria, job descriptions, and reporting
relationships). It also relates to the different mechanisms for coordinating different
divisions amongst each other (e.g. standardisation of processes, outputs and skills;
cross-departmental relations; lateral and vertical communication) (Kates and
Galbraith, 2010; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989). In this vein, Foss, Lyngsie and Zahra
(2013) describe organisational design in a parsimonious and comprehensive way as
a combination of two main dimensions: decentralisation and coordination.
Decentralisation refers to the distribution of formal decision-making hierarchical
authority in an organisation. In the context of the MNE, scholars have argued that
(de)centralization is “one of the fundamental dimensions of organization design”
(Egelhoff, 1988: 129). It describes the degree of hierarchical authority exerted by
headquarters over their subsidiaries’ decisions (Ghoshal and Nohria, 1993; Nohria
and Ghoshal 1994; Tsai, 2002). Coordination describes the degree to which firms
rely on different formal, informal and relational coordination devices (e.g.,
formalisation and standardisation instruments, lateral relationships, lateral and
vertical communication channels).
Following the network view of the MNE (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990), the MNE
represents a network of geographically dispersed units, the subsidiaries. We adopt
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Birkinshaw and Pedersen’s (2008) definition of subsidiary as as a discrete value-
adding activity outside an MNE’s home country. Thus, this view shifts the focus to
the subsidiary as the unit of analysis, and the organisational design of the MNE is
depicted by the nature of the subsidiaries’ relationships with the MNE’s HQ and
other subsidiaries in the MNE. The nature of this internal nexus of relationships
between subsidiaries and headquarters is designed by the blend of coordination and
hierarchical (centralization) mechanisms that govern these relationships (Ghoshal
and Bartlett, 1990; Ghoshal and Nohria, 1993).
2.2.3 CPA performance in the EU: organising to promote
GAMs’ social capital
EU lobbying takes place in a system of elite pluralism (Coen, 2007). Access to
policy-making forums (whose membership is competitive yet strategically advisable)
is restricted. An important resource for accessing these forums is information
(Broscheid and Coen, 2003). Lobbying in Brussels is about the ability to provide
technical expertise. Elite pluralism also emphasises the importance of collective
over individual political action (Aspinwall and Greenwood, 2013). The European
Commission and the European Parliament are responsible for respectively drafting
and approving technical legislative proposals that promote common European
interests. There are currently 2,111 European-level federations and business
associations lobbying the European institutions1. These associations build consensus
positions that channel the different opinions of their members. For EU policy
officials, business associations thus represent a key source of information about the
aggregated needs and interests of particular sectors in the EU internal market
(Bouwen, 2004). Associations supply information to legitimise their access to the
policy-making process, with the goal of making their members’ collective voices
heard in policy discussions and, ultimately, influencing policy outcomes (Chalmers,
2013).
1 http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do, Accessed June 9 2016
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The main association representing the vehicle manufacturing industry in the EU is
the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (French: Association des
constructeurs européens d'automobile, abbreviated ACEA). Its members include
manufacturers of passenger cars, vans, trucks and buses with production sites in the
EU. ACEA’s mission is to advocate the common interests of the European
automobile industry. It engages in dialogue on behalf of its members with the
European institutions and other stakeholders to advance understanding of industry-
related issues, and to contribute to effective policy and legislation at both European
and global levels2.
Brussels-based GAMs operate at the interface between their firms and European
business associations. As boundary spanners, they act in effect as a ‘window in’ to
the firm, ensuring that internal colleagues receive information about developments
in business associations (Post et al., 1982). Simultaneously, they can be a ‘window
out’ of the firm, ensuring that their colleagues’ views on policy issues are
communicated to other association members (ibid). GAMs are frequently specialists
in political communications rather than experts in a specific technical field. Their
ability, in this system of elite pluralism, to contribute actively to collective political
action bodies is contingent on their relationships with internal colleagues whose
expertise GAMs require to participate constructively in discussions on technical,
policy issues. This understanding of lobbying suggests that developing both GAMs'
external and internal social networks may be of importance for influencing rather
than simply monitoring policy developments at the EU level. Internal and external
views of social capital are not mutually exclusive (Adler and Kwon, 2002). The
behaviour of actors is influenced both by external linkages and the fabric of their
internal linkages. Obtaining a comprehensive picture of the role played by social
capital in CPA performance requires consideration of both types of social capital.
We have limited knowledge on how managers should organize their MNEs to foster
the internal and external social capital of their boundary-spanning GAMs and
consequently the performance of their GA subsidiaries. Gooderham, Minbaeva and
2 http://www.acea.be/about-acea/what-we-do Accessed 9 June 2016
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Pedersen (2010), building on the assertion that an important antecedent of social
capital is the social structure within which an actor is located (Adler and Kwon,
2002), find that hierarchical (i.e. centralised) governance mechanisms undermine the
formation of social capital. Thus, we aim to provide a normative explanation that
contributes to managerial and scholarly understandings of how to promote firms’
political activities. To this end, we adopt a multi-level, longitudinal approach to
explore the role of organisation design on GAMs’ internal and external social capital
and subsequently on their capacity to influence political actors.
2.3 Research design and methods
Informed by existing theory, our data collection and analysis were designed to
explore relationships between CPA performance, social capital and organisational
design mechanisms. Consequently, our research adopted an abductive (Meyer and
Lunnay, 2012) rather than an inductive approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).
Abduction allows researchers to broaden existing knowledge as well as introduce
new ideas (e.g. Habermas, 1978). It provides the flexibility associated with
exploratory, inductive research by ensuring that individual’s perspectives
predominate and that results are grounded in data. It has the added benefit of
including theoretical frameworks in the analysis process whilst also considering
unintended observations of empirical data which can remain unclear with a
deductive approach (Meyer and Lunnay, 2012).
2.3.1 Research setting and context
We focus on the case studies of Toyota Motor Europe’s European and
Government Affairs Division and the Hyundai Motor Company Brussels Office
(HMCBO). Case-study research is appropriate for research studying a
phenomenon in its context and involving numerous levels of analysis (e.g. Yin,
2013). The context of this study is complex: it covers both the external
policymaking network of the EU and the internal corporate networks in which
our two focal GA subsidiaries are embedded. It considers how changes in the
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relationships of Toyota and Hyundai’s GAMs in these two networks had
subsequent effects on the political performance of their GA subsidiaries in
Brussels. Scholars have not studied how the GAMs of MNE subsidiaries create
and maintain social capital. Thus, our case study design enables us to provide
useful insights into a phenomenon previously unexamined.
2.3.2 Choice of cases
Focusing on the Brussels-based GA functions of Toyota and Hyundai enabled us to
hold constant factors that might be considered to impact on firms’ political
performance in general, and their employees’ social capital in particular (see Table
1). Both are the Brussels-based GA subsidiaries of non-European MNEs. Their
GAMs were Europeans and recruited to represent the interests of MNEs that were
developing manufacturing and commercial operations in Europe. In terms of
headcount, the GA function of each firm in Brussels was the same size. According
to the European Transparency Register, the GAMs of each company had declared
interests in comparable areas of European policy, including environmental,
competition, trade and transport policy.
Table 1: Description of case studies and case data.
























Both MNEs had unique expertise in specific areas of automotive technology
(gasoline-hybrid technology for Toyota, and fuel-cell electric vehicle technology for
Hyundai). Compared to other volume car manufacturers, both Toyota and Hyundai
(together with its Kia brand) had relatively small market shares in Europe (see
Figure 1). However, the firms considered Europe to be a key strategic region for
future growth (Hyundai Motor Company, 2014; Kia Motors, 2014; Toyota Motor
Corporation, 2014).
Figure 1: Market share (%) of volume car manufacturers in Europe, 1999-
2014.
Source: ACEA. Hyundai data includes both Hyundai and Kia brands
Importantly for our research, our case organisations are embedded in very different
corporate contexts. Hyundai and Toyota have distinctive leadership styles that have
given rise to specific organisation design characteristics and organisational cultures
(Shul Shim and Steers, 2012). Decision-making in TMC is centralized, for both
strategic and local operational decisions. HMC is structured and coordinated to
encourage employees to feel a close affiliation with their specific corporate division
(manufacturing, RandD, sales) (ibid).
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We note that Toyota opened its Brussels-based GA subsidiary in 1999, and Hyundai
ten years later in 2009. This ten-year ‘head start’ may be crucial in explaining
differences in the evolution of GAMs’ social capital and political performance. One
might argue that, during our period of study, Hyundai’s GAMs were experiencing a
learning curve as they familiarised themselves with the EU system of lobbying and
built relationships. However, our results reveal that HMC staffed its Brussels office
from the outset with seasoned EU lobbyists who possessed extensive experience and
existing contacts in the areas of EU environmental and transport policy. We show
that Hyundai’s GAMs, owing to organisational design issues, experienced
difficulties in maintaining their pervious political contacts and influencing policy
outcomes in Hyundai’s favour.
2.3.3 Data sources
Our research draws on semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted between
August 2014 and June 2016. Six informants were current or previous GAMs who
possessed direct, first- hand experience of the historical development of Toyota and
Hyundai’s political actions in Brussels. Two informants had been responsible
respectively for establishing Toyota and Hyundai’s European GA subsidiaries.
Informants commented on the highly sensitive nature of our research, and agreed to
participate only on the understanding that interviews would not be recorded, and
would not be used to generate direct quotations attributable to specific individuals.
Our data-collection experiences mirror the challenges faced by others (e.g. Dieleman
and Boddewyn, 2012) who have attempted to examine internal organisational
factors and their impact on firms’ political actions.
Interviews covered broad issues dealing with GAMs’ political performance, their
social capital, and the organisational design mechanisms utilised by their MNEs (see
the Appendix for a list of questions). Capturing the direct influence of firms over EU
policy outcomes is hampered by distinct, context-dependent methodological
problems (e.g. Chalmers, 2011).
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Because EU-level lobbying is collective in character, it is extremely difficult to
attribute policy outcomes categorically to the actions of individual GAMs or firms
(e.g. Beyers, Eising and Maloney, 2008). To avoid these methodological issues, we
described the effectiveness of each firm’s lobbying activities in terms of GAMs’
perceived ability to influence the policy positions issued by business associations.
We gathered information on the social capital of European GAMs through questions
about the linkages they developed with both internal and external counterparts.
Following Tsai and Ghoshal (1998), we asked questions on the structural, relational
and cognitive dimensions of GAMs’ social capital. We invited GAMs to comment
on the number of their internal and external relationships, to talk about the degree of
trust that existed in those relationships, and to assess whether GAMs shared with
their internal and external contacts a shared vision that facilitated collective actions.
To collect information on organisational design issues, we asked our GAM
informants as per Foss et al. (2013) to comment on the level of decentralisation in
their MNEs by indicating at which organisational level (HQ versus subsidiary)
decision-making authority tended to be vested. We captured insights on coordination
issues by asking informants to indicate how often they participated in
formal/informal and permanent/temporary mechanisms such as committees and
cross-functional work groups (ibid).
Our research is based primarily on the perceptions of Brussels-based GAMs.
Perceptual data can be problematic in terms of upward bias. For example, GAMs’
perceptions of their influence may not necessarily be the same as their actual
influence. To increase the validity and reliability of our data, we therefore
interviewed three non-GAM employees from our case companies, three industry
experts from European-level business associations to which our focal companies
belonged, and two GAMs representing other European auto manufacturers. This
triangulation enabled us to cross-check the perceptions of our GAM informants (Yin,
2013).
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Our interviews generated over 50 hours of data capturing the evolution of
Toyota and Hyundai’s lobbying activities in Brussels during the period 1999-
2015. To respect guarantees of confidentiality, the identities of our interviewees
are necessarily anonymised in this article. We augmented our interview data
with information from public sources, including specialist European press and
firms’ annual reports. This provided additional political, economic and corporate
context for our analysis.
2.3.4 Data analysis
The temporal character of our research necessitated a processual analysis of changes
in our focal companies’ relationship-building activities. Such analytical approaches
are rare in CPA research (e.g. Schuler, 2002). Guided by prior studies (e.g. Langley,
1999; Skippari, 2005), we adopted a narrative approach that included the
construction of case histories. The analysis of these histories proceeded in four
stages. We (i) identified temporal patterns in GAMs’ political actions in Brussels, (ii)
considered the historical evolution of GAMs’ internal and external social capital (iii)
undertook a contextual analysis to uncover explanations for temporal variations in
their subsidiary’s political performance, which included (iv) an analysis of the
evolution of the degree of decentralisation and coordination between the European
GA’s office and the rest of the MNE. Academic colleagues reviewed our data
analysis and resolved any discrepancies in the co-authors’ interpretations of the
interview data. Through this process, we arrived at a set of formally stated
observations.
2.4 Results
Tables 2 and 3 provide summarises of the interview data upon which our research is
based.
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High coordination with HQ via expatriated Japanese
colleagues; rare cooperation between GA subsidiary and
other European subsidiaries
High coordination with HQ via English as official corporate
language; improved cooperation with other European
subsidiaries via External Affairs Meeting and Government
& Technical Affairs Group
GAMs’ internal social
capital
Structural Formal structural links with HQ staff via Japanese
coordinators; infrequent contacts with colleagues in other
European subsidiaries
GAM ties with HQ staff loosen; relationships with staff in
other European subsidiaries multiply
Relational High levels of trust between GAMs and HQ staff; less trust
between GAMs and colleagues in other European
subsidiaries
Further development of trust between GAMs and GEAD
staff; growing trust between GAMs and colleagues in
European subsidiaries
Cognitive GAMs, GEAD staff, and colleagues in European subsidiaries
had different visions of European lobbying
GAMs and staff in European subsidiaries increasingly
sharing objectives and beliefs





Structural GAMs engaged in sporadic contact building with MEPs; they
had no formal links with members of ACEA
GAMs increasing number of links with members of
relevant associations (ACEA, Business Europe, CSR
Europe)
Relational MEPs and ACEA members considered Toyota and its
GAMs to be “the enemy”
GAMs’ earning trust of ACEA members by promoting
their knowledge of Toyota’s environmental credentials




No political influence Political influence over
environmental policy issues
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Lack of autonomy – GA subsidiary strongly
orchestrated from HQ
Continued lack of autonomy – all European subsidiaries





Coordination between GA subsidiary and other European
subsidiaries not a priority: for example, no shared IT
system between GA subsidiary and
HQ
Continued lack of coordination: European Affairs





Structural Formal structural links with HQ staff via Korean
coordinators; no structural linkages with colleagues in
other European subsidiaries
Difficulties building structural ties with colleagues in other
European subsidiaries
Relational Absence of trust between GAMs and HQ staff Perceived high levels of mutual mistrust between
GAMs and HQ staff
Cognitive Stark differences of opinion regarding content and purpose
of lobbying activities
GAMs did not feel cognitively connected to decision-
makers in HQ; little sense of shared, common purpose with
colleagues in European subsidiaries





Structural GAMs had address books of existing contacts in relevant
associations (ACEA, Business Europe)
GAMs maintain existing structural links in ACEA
Relational Existing contacts in these associations were based on
trust
ACEA members’ trust in GAMs decreasing due to their
inability to share relevant information
Cognitive GAMs shared with colleagues in other OEMs common






We begin our analysis by comparing the evolution of the internal and external social
capital of Toyota and Hyundai’s GAMs’ social capital. We present the structural
character of these linkages in Figures 2 and 3, and provide below a more nuanced
analysis of their relational and cognitive dimensions. Next, we indicate how
evolutions in the configuration of GAMs’ internal and external social capital over
this period of time impacted on their subsidiaries’ CPA performance. Finally, we
report how organisational design issues at Toyota and Hyundai over time either
promoted or hampered the ability and motivation of their European GAMs to
develop their internal and external social capital.
2.4.1 The internal and external social capital of GAMs
2.4.1.1. Toyota
TMC created its Brussels-based European GA subsidiary in 1999. From the outset,
GAMs enjoyed strong, trust-based relationships with colleagues at the centralised
GA unit at corporate headquarters, the Global External Affairs Division (GEAD). In
the early stages, communication between GEAD and the GAMs was facilitated by
Japanese coordinators (see ① in Figure 2). GAMs earned this trust by demonstrating
public relations competence and attention to detail, and by quickly and transparently
informing GEAD about political developments of corporate relevance (Interview
with Toyota GAM, February 2015). Trust between Toyota’s European GAMs and
GEAD colleagues had developed further by 2015, so much so that Japanese
coordinators were no longer required to facilitate communication between them (see




Figure 2: Internal and external networks of Toyota’s European GAMs
The number and quality of linkages between European GAMs and their colleagues in
Toyota Motor Sales and Marketing Europe and Toyota Motor Engineering and
Manufacturing Europe (Toyota’s European RandD activities) (see ② in Figure 2)
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took time to develop. Initially, GAMs considered that colleagues in other subsidiaries
did not understand, or perceive the need for, GA expertise and that they still had to
win their trust (Interview with former Toyota GAM, May 2016). GAMs considered
they had little ‘gas’ to put down the ‘pipes’ they were attempting to develop to
political contacts in ACEA (Interview with Toyota GAM, October 2014). By 2015,
however, relationships between GAMs and their colleagues in other subsidiaries
increasingly became based on trust and shared objectives (see ⑤ in Figure 2). GAMs
reported that on-going interactions, within for example the External Affairs Meeting
and the Technical and Government Affairs Group, with other functions laid the
foundations for a common set of GA goals and beliefs, which guided collaboration
and promoted the sharing of information (Interviews with Toyota GAMs, January
2015 and June 2016).
As their quality of their relationships with internal colleagues improved, so did their
relationships with external policy actors. In 1999, external structural linkages
between GAMs and policy actors in the automotive sector were all but non-existent,
despite some sporadic, desultory contact-building with Members of the European
Parliament (MEP) (see ③ in Figure 2) (Interviews with Toyota GAMs, August and
January 2015). MEPs of certain nationalities, especially German, considered
Toyota’s GAMs as representatives of “the enemy” that threatened European
manufacturers (Interview with Toyota GAM, February 2015). Earning the trust of
ACEA members was similarly challenging. GAMs reported that they shared with
other OEMs’ GAMs a common approach to lobbying (Interview with Toyota GAM,
February 2015). However, PSA Peugeot-Citroën and Ford of Europe – volume car
makers nervous of a vulnerable European market shares – were anxious about
opening up the ACEA to Toyota (Interview with Toyota GAM, October 2014;
Interview with Industry Expert, March 2015).
However, the knowledge acquired by GAMs through collaboration with subsidiary
colleagues changed this situation by 2015. It enabled them to grow their formal
structural linkages with influential European-level business and professional
associations (see ⑥in Figure 2). In 2004, they joined CSR Europe (a network of
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businesses seeking to enhance sustainable growth and positively contribute to
society). A year later, they obtained membership of the Advisory and Support Group
(ASG) of UNICE (now Business Europe), the federation of national business
associations. By 2007, GAMs had also brought TME into ACEA. GAMs’ knowledge
of Toyota’s pre-eminence in gasoline-hybrid technology, promising significantly
reduced CO2 emissions, and acquired from their relationships with RandD
colleagues, seems to have encouraged ACEA to bring the company into the
association (Interview with TME GAM, October 2014, Interview with Industry
Expert, April 2015).
By 2015, Toyota’s GAMs had also succeeded in earning the trust of their ACEA
counterparts. They did so by promoting their company’s perceived environmental
credentials. This contributed to the company’s acceptance by ACEA members
(Interviews with Industry Experts, February and March 2015, May 2016). To
demonstrate that they shared similar cognitive schemes with their European peers,
they also invested considerable time and effort in the ‘Europeanisation’ of Toyota
(Interview with Toyota GAM, January 2015). They stressed that they were
themselves Europeans working for a Japanese company that was becoming
increasingly European.
2.4.1.2. Hyundai
HMC opened its GA subsidiary in Brussels in 2009. Externally, the social capital of
the GAMs recruited by Hyundai to launch its European GA subsidiary varied from
that of the GAMs recruited by Toyota. They were seasoned GA professionals with
specialisations in EU environment and transport policy. They had worked as
parliamentary assistants in the European Parliament, interns in the Commission, and
managers in Brussels-based public- relations consultancies and business associations.
One had previous experience working in government affairs for another car
manufacturer. They had address books of existing trust- based contacts working in
organisations such as ACEA and Business Europe that were directly relevant to




Figure 3: Internal and external networks of Hyundai’s European GAMs
Internally, however, European GAMs had no structural linkages with colleagues in
HMC’s other European subsidiaries. They were formally connected only to the
Overseas Policy Coordination Team (OPCT) – HMC’s centralised GA unit at
corporate headquarters –via expatriated coordinators (see ① in Figure 3). This
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relationship was marked by an absence of trust, and stark differences of opinion
regarding the content and purpose of lobbying activities. For example, GAMs were
not supposed to conduct meetings outside the office without a Korean being present
(Interview with Toyota GAM, October 2014). They grasped the importance of using
technical expertise to shape the policy positions issued collectively by business
associations, but felt that OPCT colleagues did not share this particular view of
lobbying. (Interview with GAMs at Hyundai October 2014). In 2011, GAMs had
used their existing external social capital in Brussels to bring Hyundai into ACEA
(see ⑤ in Figure 3). However, by 2015 ,they were experiencing challenges in
managing and maintaining their relationships with ACEA members (Interviews with
Hyundai GAM, March, 2015 and Industry Expert, January, 2015). Their attempts at
maintaining these existing external relationships were in effect hindered by
difficulties in building meaningful internal ties that would help them access
information to consolidate external trust (see ④ in Figure 3). For example, they
created in 2012 the European Affairs Committee, bringing together the top two
executives of HMC’s five companies in Europe to discuss matters of mutual interest.
Much to the GAMs’ disappointment, the committee did not generate the information
or momentum necessary for GAMs to engage effort to influence work within the key
business associations (Interviews with Hyundai GAMs, October 2014 and February
2015). European GAMs also alluded to the increasingly challenging character of
their relationships with OPCT colleagues (see ③ in Figure 3). They perceived high
levels of mistrust and they could not rely on them to provide meaningful policy
positions or effective negotiating tactics. On the rare occasions that the company did
have a position (“we do not like the idea of an EU-Japan trade agreement”), the
mandate for negotiation given to the Europeans was considered not immediately
constructive (“you will stop the EU securing a trade agreement with Japan”)
(Interview with Hyundai GAM, October 2014). Ultimately the Europeans did not
feel directly connected – either structurally, relationally or cognitively – with their
company headquarters or the key decision-makers within it (Interviews with Hyundai
GAMs, January 2015 and February 2015).
In summary, Toyota’s European GAMs were increasingly able to foster relationships
with external policy actors as they developed more and better relationships with
33
colleagues in other European subsidiaries, such as their RandD colleagues. By
contrast, Hyundai GAMs’ initial, positive relationships with external policy actors
were beginning to weaken. They lacked the internal linkages they considered
necessary for gathering information to continue nurturing those relationships. Based
on these observations, we suggest that the external social capital of GAMs is
influenced by their internal social capital.
2.4.2 GAMs’ external social capital and CPA performance
of European GA subsidiaries
In the earliest stages, GAMs at neither Toyota nor Hyundai made efforts to influence
policy in Brussels. They sought only to establish processes necessary for monitoring
political developments in the EU institutions and reporting them to corporate
headquarters. They nonetheless appreciated the need to develop their firm’s GA
functions so that they could in due course seek to exert influence on future regulatory
developments. As they set out to develop their GA functions, GAMs at Toyota and
Hyundai departed from different starting points. As reported above, their structural,
relational and cognitive linkages with internal colleagues were weak. However, the
external relationships of Toyota’s GAMs appeared less established than those of their
counterparts at Hyundai.
By 2015, Toyota’s European GAMs had developed a GA function that could be
considered superior compared to that of their Hyundai counterparts. Because they
had managed, over time, to build structural, relational and cognitive links with
colleagues in Europe, especially those working in RandD, Toyota’s GAMs were able
to contribute to EU environmental policy debates. They had positioned themselves as
specialist insiders in the EU system of policymaking (Interview with Toyota GAM,
October 2014; Interview with Toyota RandD Specialist, February 2015). From this
position, they contributed to policy discussions surrounding environmental issues
(Interview with Industry Expert, March 2015), and the EU institutions also consulted
them individually on such questions. In sharp contrast, Hyundai’s GAMs had
practically no political influence in Brussels by 2015. (Interview with Hyundai
GAMs, March 2015 and May 2016). GAMs were using ACEA primarily for
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information- gathering purposes. They had been unable to transform their historical
relations into political leverage for Hyundai. HMC had recruited a strong team of GA
professionals in Brussels who were hindered by headquarters staff whose priorities
differed from those of ACEA’s others members (Interview with Industry Expert,
January 2015).
In summary, Toyota’s European GA subsidiary has been able to exert influence on in
particular environmental policymaking in Brussels. This was because, with the
passage of time, its GAMs had earned the trust of ACEA members by promoting
Toyota’s perceived environmental leadership and by emphasising the company’s
European credentials. The European GA subsidiary of Hyundai has not been able to
exert any political influence compared to Toyota because its GAMs have only
superficial, structural links with key policy actors in Brussels. Our comparative data
thus suggest that CPA performance of GA subsidiaries is influenced by their GAMs’
external social capital.
2.4.3 Organisational design and internal social capital
Why did Toyota’s GAMs succeed in building the internal social capital needed to
develop external social capital and exert political influence, whilst their counterparts
at Hyundai could not? Below, we explore this question by considering the impact of
different organisational designs.
2.4.3.1. Toyota
When it founded its GA subsidiary in 1999, TMC managed its European operations
in a decentralised way. Its European manufacturing, marketing and RandD activities
operated within a model of freestanding and largely autonomous subsidiaries: Toyota
Motor Engineering and Manufacturing Europe, Toyota Motor Manufacturing Europe,
and Toyota Motor Sales and Marketing Europe. Each of these European subsidiaries
had its own strategic goals and activities, and cooperation between them was rare.
Within this organisational configuration, the European GA subsidiary enjoyed
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relatively high levels of autonomy and its GAMs had low levels of internal social
capital. By 2015, the independence of the GA subsidiary, and its degree of
coordination with other European subsidiaries, had positively evolved. These
evolutions were made possible by changes to organisational structures. For example,
TMC merged its three separate European subsidiaries in 2003 to create Toyota Motor
Europe (TME). Subsequently, Toyota’s European employees were increasingly
obligated to stand on their own feet, to become completely profitable, and no longer
rely on the support of TMC (Interviews with former Toyota GAM and Toyota
RandD Engineer, May 2015).
Increased decentralisation enabled GAMs to multiply and strengthen their links with
colleagues in Europe. They were able autonomously to initiate coordination
mechanisms aimed at establishing direct, structural connections with colleagues
whose knowledge they needed to represent their firm’s interests in Brussels
(Interview with former Toyota GAM, May 2016). Indeed, the External Affairs
Meeting (itself created shortly after the creation of TME in 2003) almost
immediately increased the number and frequency of structural ties between GAMs
and their marketing colleagues. GAMs were invited to speak at events in regional
sales offices in, for example, Dresden, Reykjavik, Stockholm and Warsaw. They also
participated in lobbying activities with sales colleagues around Europe (Interview
with former Toyota GAM, January 2015).
Integrating colleagues from RandD and manufacturing into the External Affairs
Meeting proved more challenging. Following the creation of TME, these remained
attached to their specific corporate identities. However, as the new decentralised
organisational structure began to take hold, competition between colleagues working
in different functions began to fade. This enabled GAMs to consolidate the External
Affairs Meeting and develop good internal contacts with all the relevant people in
TME’s three main subsidiaries and national offices across Europe.
The quantity and quality of linkages between GAMs and their RandD colleagues
increased as a result of corporate structuring initiated by Didier Leroy, President and
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CEO of Toyota Motor Europe, in 2010. Leroy recognised the need to break down
silos in TME and pushed for more cross-functional activities, the objective being to
improve the frequency and detail of communication between subsidiaries (Interview
with Toyota RandD Engineer, May 2016). The Government and Technical Affairs
Group created in 2009 was a beneficiary of this restructuring. It enabled RandD staff
and GAMs to make common cause on lobbying. They pooled their common
knowledge to organise joint initiatives on road safety and environmental issues
(Interview with Toyota GAM, October 2014; Interview with Toyota RandD Engineer,
February 2015).
2.4.3.2. Hyundai
In contrast to TMC, HMC’s European subsidiaries were in 2009 all strongly
orchestrated by senior managers in their respective business divisions at the firm’s
separate corporate and RandD headquarters. Within this highly centralised structure,
Hyundai’s political strategy in Brussels was driven by OPCT managers in Seoul,
expecting it to be implemented by Europeans in the Brussels office as their agents.
Coordination amongst different units was also not a priority. For instance, the
Koreans and the Brussels-based GAMs initially did not share a common IT system.
As reported above, the internal social capital of Hyundai’s GAMs was, like that of
their Toyota counterparts, low.
In contrast to Toyota, Hyundai’s European GA subsidiary in 2015 continued to lack
autonomy and remained loosely coordinated from other subsidiaries. Although a
European had been recruited as the Executive Representative of the Brussels office,
it was his Korean coordinators who were essentially in charge (Interviews with
Hyundai GAMs, October 2014, December 2014 and January 2015). Over time,
European GAMs began to view their coordinators as controllers rather than
facilitators. From the European GAMs’ perspective, (Interview with Hyundai GAM,
October 2014) Korean managers gave orders, and these were expected to be followed
by the European GAMs to save the face of the issuing manager. They also felt that
Korean coordinators introduced an additional, parallel channel of communication
that made dialogue with OPCT and other headquarter colleagues more difficult
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(Interview with Hyundai GAM, January 2015). The use of Korean as the corporate
language also excluded the Europeans from the key internal networks taking
decisions and wielding power.
This high degree of centralisation, coupled with underdeveloped coordination
devices, prevented GAMs from building internal relationships and exchanging
knowledge with their European colleagues. The experiences of the European Affairs
Committee, which ultimately failed to promote collaboration or knowledge sharing
between HMC employees in Europe, provide a case in point. The committee actually
strengthened the centralised control by headquarters staff over European lobbying
operations. It was dominated by Koreans, all of whom looked to Korea for
instructions. His experiences of working in the European Affairs Committee led one
informant to conclude that senior managers in Seoul were actively encouraging the
internalisation of adversarial relationships to pit one European subsidiary against
another and facilitate control from above. Whilst potentially effective in Korea, he
considered this conscious lack of coordination to be ineffectual in Europe.
In summary, European GAMs at Toyota – working in an increasingly decentralised
and strongly coordinated context – were more able to take initiatives aimed at
developing social capital internally. European GAMs at Hyundai reported that, in
their attempts to increase the quantity and quality of their relationships with internal
colleagues, they felt constrained by their MNE’s highly centralised structure of
loosely coordinated subsidiaries. We thus suggest that the internal social capital of
GAMs is affected by organisational design issues. Specifically, GAMs working in
decentralised GA subsidiaries which are also highly coordinated with other MNE
units develop higher levels of internal social capital.
2.5 Discussion
Our study exposes GAMs as boundary spanners whose external social capital is an
important antecedent of the political performance of MNEs’ GA subsidiaries. This
supports existing outcomes-focused studies demonstrating that organisations are
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likely to achieve higher levels of policy performance when they establish with
external policymaking bodies linkages characterised by trust and openness
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Hillman et al, 2004; Shaffer, 1995). However,
research identifying that social capital either facilitates or impedes corporate political
actions is arguably of little scholarly or managerial relevance unless it provides
managers with guidance on how they can create and maintain social capital in the
political arena. We therefore explored beyond our initial, conventional finding to
expose the determinants of individual GAMs’ external social capital and explore how
these may evolve over time.
We expose the need, when studying GAMs and their boundary-spanning activities, to
make an important distinction between their external and internal social capital.
Demonstrating that both types of social capital are not mutually exclusive (Adler and
Kwon, 2002), one of our first important findings is that GAMs’ internal social capital
is an important antecedent of their external social capital. In the case of Toyota,
GAMs perceived for example that they could make an increasing contribution to
discussions surrounding EU environmental policy when they had managed over time
to develop relationships with their RandD colleagues in Europe.
They could in effect use their internal social capital to acquire information for
developing external relationships and building external social capital in business
associations, especially ACEA. In sharp contrast, European GAMs at Hyundai
considered that they lacked comparatively meaningful relationships with internal
colleagues. Consequently, they felt they had insufficient access to the technical
knowledge required to maintain their existing external relationships or develop new
external relationships more deeply. In essence, GAMs need to be well connected
with their internal colleagues in other units in order to have access to the technical
expertise required to develop meaningful external relationships with policy actors.
A further, important finding of our research is that the organisational design of an
MNE can potentially promote or weaken the internal social capital of individual
GAMs’ working in its GA subsidiaries. European GAMs at Hyundai reported that, in
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their attempts to increase the quantity and quality of their relationships with internal
colleagues, they felt constrained by their MNE’s highly centralised structure of
loosely coordinated subsidiaries. By contrast, European GAMs at Toyota – working
in a more decentralised and strongly coordinated subsidiary – were more able to take
initiatives aimed at developing social capital internally, especially following the
creation of TME in 2003. This finding echoes prior research (Adler and Kwon, 2002;
Gooderham et al., 2010) suggesting that an important antecedent of social capital of
MNE employees is the social structure within which an actor is located.
Overall, our research suggests that organisational design can explain differences in
CPA performance. Scholars have identified organisational structure as an important
factor moderating the performance effects of external political ties (Sun, Mellahi and
Wright, 2012; Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012). Our study complements this existing
scholarship from both a theoretical and practical perspective.
Theoretically, Sun et al. (2012) combine market transaction and social exchange
perspectives, such as resource dependence theory, to argue that a firm’s capacity to
appropriate value from its political ties is moderated by its organisational features
(including size, ownership and structure). Relatedly, Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012)
mobilise resource dependence theory to explore how a firm’s capacity to protect
itself from risks associated with political ties is contingent upon a loosely-
coordinated, compartmentalised organisation structure. They recognise, however,
that such structures may prevent other units in the MNE from capturing the benefits
of accessing relevant business information from external policy actors (ibid). We
complement Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012) by further showing how such
structures can become a barrier, preventing GAMs from internally accessing
information needed to create valuable political ties and influence policymakers.
Using concepts gleaned from social capital theory, we suggest that, in the EU context,
organisational structures fostering relationships that encourage information sharing
are an important antecedent of a firm’s capacity to influence policy actors.
Concretely, we posit that such organisational structures should be characterised by
low levels of HQ control and high levels of coordination between subsidiaries. We
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thus emphasise the benefits of increasing the coordination between GA subsidiaries
and other units in the MNE.
From a practical perspective, the complementarity between our research and other
studies (e.g. Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012) provides managers with guidance on
how to manage the dual challenge of mitigating the risks associated with inevitable
dependence relationships with policymakers, whilst simultaneously trying to
influence those policymakers. Our study is particularly instructive for managers from
emerging MNEs with GA subsidiaries in developed country contexts. Mechanisms
such as compartmentalisation may be useful in emerging economies, where the onus
is on managing political risks. However, GAMs working in information-based
lobbying systems, such as the EU, may benefit from working in an organisation
structure characterised by highly coordinated subsidiaries whose employees readily
share information with each other.
2.6 Conclusions, limitations and future research
In this paper, we aimed to extend our understanding of the international dimensions
of CPA by exploring how the social capital of GAMs, and in turn the political
performance of their GA subsidiary, is affected by evolutions in MNE organisational
design and structure. Our key findings build on existing CPA research that has
considered the notion of social capital.
Specifically, we expose intriguing insights into the interrelationship between
organisational design mechanisms and GAMs’ social capital, and how these affect
CPA performance. First, we find that the quantity and quality of GAMs’ external
relationships, and in turn the CPA performance of their GA subsidiaries, is
influenced by the quantity and quality of their internal relationships with colleagues
in other subsidiaries. Second, we find that these internal relationships are affected by
organisational design issues. Combined, these findings respond to calls for more
scholarly and practical knowledge on how managerial interventions can improve
CPA performance (Hillman et al., 2004: Lawton et al., 2013). They also respond to a
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theoretical need to understand variations in the social capital of GAMs. Our multi-
level and longitudinal perspective also responds to a practitioner need to understand
ways of developing GAMs’ social capital in the first place.
Rather than providing definitive answers, our study prompts further research. In this
vein, we openly acknowledge the limitations of our study, and suggest that these
limitations serve as the basis for future scholarly enquiry. One obvious limitation is
that of generalizability. Our sample is clearly derived from only two case
organisations, both located in Europe, operating in the same industry, and
representing MNEs from Asia. Further studies focused on the GA functions of MNEs
headquartered outside Asia, operating in other industry sectors, and politically active
in other regional contexts are clearly needed to substantiate the generalizability of
our findings. Another promising way of reviving interest in the organisation design
of CPA may be to investigate further how individual GA subsidiaries in different
institutional and industry contexts can be organised to deal with possible dual
tensions of managing inevitable dependence relationships with policymakers whilst
simultaneously trying to influence them. Rather than focusing on a single subsidiary,
future scholars could study this challenge by exploring how the MNE as a whole
organises its global, differentiated network of GA subsidiaries.
2.7 Appendix: Questions used to guide semi-structured
interviews
General introductory questions
 What is your role?
 How long have you held this position?
 What job did you do before holding this position?
Questions on the organisation of business operations in Europe
 How would you describe the amount of independence of your
subsidiary in your MNE?
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 Has the amount of independence evolved over time?
 Can you identify a clear change in the degree of autonomy?
 How coordinated is your subsidiary with the rest of the MNE?
 For example, do you receive training at HQ?
 Are you kept informed about technical developments taking place
elsewhere in the MNE?
 Do you work with other European subsidiaries, in for
example teams or joint committees?
 How has coordination evolved over time?
Questions about relationships with ACEA
 How would you describe your relationship with ACEA and its
OEM members of ACEA?
 How have these relationships evolved over time?
General questions about influence over EU regulatory affairs
 How would you describe the influence of your GA subsidiary
over EU regulatory affairs?
 How has this influence evolved over time?
 Could you possibly provide some examples?
Questions about relationships with European GA subsidiaries (asked to non-GA
informants)
 How would you describe your relationship with your European GA
subsidiary?
 How has this relationship evolved since the creation of the GA subsidiary?
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Through a case study of the government affairs (GA) activities of a large UK-based
manufacturing firm, we explore how the differentiation and integration of boundary-
spanning GA units may affect their ability to capture external political information and
share it with the rest of the business. Mobilising insights from organisational design
theory, we demonstrate that changes in the autonomy, specialisation and formal
coordination of the firm’s UK-based GA unit have over time positively affected its
information processing activities. The unit has been able to source political information
more proactively as its specialisation and autonomy have increased. Its ability to share
this information inside the firm has improved as it has become more integrated in the
business through formal coordination mechanisms. Our study contributes to CPA
research by deepening our understandings of the internal management and organisation
of firms’ political actions, which are overlooked in extant strategy management
literature. It provides senior executives with practical guidance on how to configure
their political units in ways that add value to firms.
3.1 Introduction
Corporate political activity (CPA) relates to efforts undertaken by firms to influence or
manage political entities (Hillman et al., 2004). Strategic management scholars suggest
that CPA is a useful tool for creating value by improving a firm’s overall performance
(Baron, 1995; Bonardi et al. 2005). CPA provides a set of strategic actions for
monitoring and influencing that firms can conduct to maximise economic returns from
the political environment (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008).
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Recent studies (Frynas et al., 2017; Lux et al., 2011; Lawton et al., 2013a; Lawton et al.,
2014; Mellahi et al., 2016; Puck et al., 2018) highlight the increasing relevance of CPA
for practitioners and scholars of strategic management, and call for a greater integration
of political, non-market perspectives in mainstream research. Despite growing interest
in the political strategies of firms, our understandings of many dimensions of CPA
remain limited. We especially know little about how the CPA function is managed and
organised in firms (Lawton et al., 2013b; Puck et al., 2018). Our research seeks to
explore further this specific aspect of CPA.
We aim to enhance our understanding of the management and organisation of CPA by
applying theoretical insights from the literature on organisational design. Rooted in the
information processing perspective (e.g. Galbraith, 1974; Thompson, 1967; Tushman
and Nadler, 1978), organisational design theory focuses on the gathering, channelling
and processing of information as the primary activities of modern organisations (Nadler
and Tushman, 1997). It is a normative approach recommending specific organisational
configurations to achieve desired objectives (Burton and Obel, 2018). It encourages
scholars and practitioners to consider the organisational levers – such as the division of
labour, task specificity, hierarchies of authority and formal organisation – that
executives can pull to improve the performance of their information exchange processes
(Felin and Powell, 2016).
Our research specifically explores the question: how can firms organise their CPA units
to capture external political information and communicate it with relevant internal
business divisions? Our focus on firms’ political monitoring activities is both relevant
and timely. Such activities represent an important dimension of CPA used by firms to
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better understand government policies, which have potential to generate increased
complexity and costs for their business operations (Lawton et al., 2013a, 2013b). Recent
political developments – including negotiations surrounding the UK’s withdrawal from
the EU, or the electoral successes of the League in Italy and AfD in Germany – have
potential knock-on effects for businesses. They highlight the need for managers to
include external political monitoring in their knowledge sourcing activities and strategic
decision-making (Barron et al., 2016).
We explore our research question through an in-depth case study of the UK-focused
government affairs (GA) unit of Alpha Plc (pseudonym) – a UK-based manufacturer of
precision technologies. Alpha’s London-based GA unit – mandated to scan political
developments in Westminster – is an example of a boundary-spanning CPA function
which mediates between the UK political environment and the rest of the firm. The unit
is geographically isolated from the firm’s major business operations, which are
dispersed across the UK. Alpha serves markets characterised by high levels of
regulatory intrusion, identifies political developments in the UK as a major source of
business risk, and depends heavily on the UK government for research funding. The
primary data underpinning our research allow us to chart evolutions in the GA unit’s
organisational design and ability to capture and share external political information
during a nine-year period, from 2010 to 2019.
Our analysis exposes change in key organisational design dimensions, including the
autonomy and specialisation of the GA unit, and its level of formal coordination with
the firm’s transportation business division. These evolutions have, in turn, affected the
information exchange processes of the GA unit. A simple, unidirectional channelling
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process has given way to higher value-adding processes exhibiting more sophisticated
work practices.
Our key findings contribute to CPA scholarship by generating new understandings of
organisational-level antecedents of firms’ political actions that are understudied in
extant literature (Lux et al., 2011; Lawton et al., 2013b, Puck et al., 2018). Recent
research examines board or senior management team characteristics – such as the
political capital of board members (e.g. Sun et al., 2016) or the creation of chief external
officers at the executive team level (e.g. Doh et al., 2014) – and their impact on the
performance and integration of CPA. In contrast, we explore at a more micro-level how
the management and organisation of business units charged with delivering a firm’s
political strategy can affect CPA performance.
We specifically complement recent studies on the organisation of boundary-spanning
CPA units (e.g. Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012; Sun et al., 2012, Barron et al., 2017).
Considering CPA units as agents of influence, these prior studies investigate how their
organisation affects the ability to perform outward-facing, representational roles
(Ancona and Caldwell, 1992). Our research advances this work by considering CPA
units as strategic scouting units (e.g. Monteiro and Birkinshaw, 2017), charged with
importing information from the corporate political environment into the firm. We
investigate how the organisation of such units impacts the ability to perform
strategically important inward-facing, informational roles (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992).
We also expose under-researched internal processes that underpin effective CPA
(Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton et al, 2013b) by fine-slicing firms’ political-monitoring
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activities into a series of increasingly value-adding sub-processes, and exploring how
these emerge over time as a consequence of changes in the organisational design of
CPA units. In terms of its managerial implications, our study provides senior executives
with practical guidance on the organisational mechanisms they can manipulate to
improve the performance of their firms’ political monitoring activities.
In making these contributions, we begin by establishing the theoretical foundations
underpinning our research. Then, we describe our research context and the methods
used to collect and analyse empirical data. We subsequently present key findings and
discuss how they contribute to existing research. We conclude by setting out the
limitations of our research and sketching out promising avenues for future studies.
3.1.1 Corporate political activity
In the field of strategic management, there has been a growing interest in CPA (Lux et
al., 2011; Lawton et al., 2013a; Puck et al., 2018) and calls to integrate firms’ strategic
political actions more systematically in mainstream research (Lawton et al., 2014).
Recent studies provide useful insights into the drivers of CPA, be these at the firm- (De
Villa et al. 2019) industry- (Mbalyohere and Lawton 2018) or institutional-level
(Banerjee and Venaik, 2018), and investigate the performance and other outcomes of
CPA (Heidenreich et al. 2014; Jia 2014; Nell et al. 2015). Prior research also indicates
that firms engage in CPA for numerous strategic reasons. For example, they may
mobilise political actions to respond defensively, such as through engaged or non-
engaged approaches (De Villa et al., 2019), to regulatory or political threats that
negatively impact firms’ strategic choices or performance. Alternatively, firms may use
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CPA proactively to change their political environments in ways that create strategic
opportunities (Heidenreich et al. 2015; Shirodkar and Mohr 2015a, b). Regardless of
whether they use CPA defensively or proactively, firms generally use CPA to better
understand regulations and government policies, which have potential to generate
increased complexity and costs for their business operations (Lawton et al., 2013a,
2013b).
Whilst we welcome this increased scholarly attention invested in CPA, we recognise
that our knowledge and understanding of many dimensions of firms’ non-market,
political strategies remains rather limited (Frynas et al., 2017; Mellahi et al., 2016; Puck
et al, 2018). In particular, we still know surprisingly little about how the CPA function
is managed and organised within firms (Lawton et al., 2013b; Puck et al., 2018). Our
research seeks to explore further this specific aspect of CPA.
3.1.2 The management and organisation of CPA
Whilst CPA scholarship has explored how organisational characteristics such as a firm
size, dependency on government, diversification, ownership and age can affect CPA
performance (e.g. Hillman et al, 2004), the internal management and organisation of
CPA has been largely overlooked in the strategic management literature. Few studies
have sought to prize open the ‘black box’ of corporate political strategizing to
understand the configuration, processes and practices of CPA within firms. CPA
research has tended to rely on aggregated proxies of firm-level activity and has
overlooked the internal mechanisms governing the design and implementation of firms’
political strategies (Lux et al., 2011; Lawton et al., 2013b).
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Nonetheless, some scholars have recently begun to build on previous work (Adams,
1976; Post et al.1982, 1983; Meznar and Nigh, 1995) to study the organisation of CPA
in terms of a boundary-spanning function (Aldrich and Herker, 1977) – one that
establishes a link between firms and the external political environment (Cui et al., 2018;
Hadani et al., 2015; Sun et al, 2012). For example, Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012)
explore how a loosely-coordinated, compartmentalised organisation structure may be an
appropriate design for buffering firms against risks that stem from their political
connections. Sun et al. (2012) theorise that the organisational structure of a firm can
moderate the value it appropriates from its political ties. Barron et al. (2017) find that
multinational enterprises can wield more political influence when their boundary-
spanning government affairs subsidiaries have high levels of autonomy and are
coordinated with other subsidiaries.
A common feature of these recent studies is that they focus on the external-facing
representational role of boundary-spanning CPA functions (Ancona and Caldwell,
1992). They highlight that CPA functions act as a ‘window out’ of the firm, defending
the activities of the firm to the outside world and engaging in influence-based actions to
ensure that the views of business units on policy issues are transmitted to policy actors
(Adams, 1976; Post et al., 1982, 1983). In so doing, they overlook that boundary-
spanning units can simultaneously perform a complementary inward-facing
informational role (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992). CPA functions can also act as
‘windows in’ (Adams, 1976; Post et al., 1982, 1983) to the firm, monitoring the
political environment and bringing into the firm intelligence that could have important
implications for business divisions (Moss et al, 2012). CPA functions are, in effect
engaged in a two-way exchange of information between firms and political actors
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(Griffin, 2005). They coordinate the transfer of political information in both directions –
from the firm to the external political environment, and from the external political
environment to the firm.
Whilst progress has been made in explaining what the boundary-spanning GA unit is,
our understanding of how its information-processing activities can be optimally
configured and managed remains underdeveloped. Despite recent advances, more in-
depth studies are still required to elucidate the internal operational processes and
management structures of CPA (Puck et al., 2018). We especially lack knowledge about
the processes through which the GA function acts as an intelligence-gathering ‘window
in’ to the firm. Extant research tends to focus on the influencing strategies of firms. It
neglects to consider that influence-based actions depend on previous monitoring actions
undertaken to keep abreast of political developments. Thus, our research explores how a
boundary-spanning CPA unit can be managed and organised to identify threats and
opportunities in external political environments and communicate these to relevant
actors in their firms.
3.1.3 Organisational design
We apply insights from organisational design theory to develop understandings of how
boundary-spanning CPA units can be configured and managed to capture more
effectively information on external political developments and integrate this
information into strategic decision-making. Organisational design theory is a normative
approach that recommends specific organisational configurations to achieve desired
objectives (Burton and Obel, 2018). Rooted in the information processing perspective
63
(e.g. Galbraith, 1974; Thompson, 1967; Tushman and Nadler, 1978), its underlying
logic states that “the primary work of modern organisations is the gathering,
channelling, and processing of appropriate information” (Nadler and Tushman, 1997:
228).
Two defining dimensions of organisational design research are differentiation and
integration (Puranam et al., 2014). Differentiation relates to the internal division of
labour, i.e., the allocation of subtasks to organisational members (such as individuals or
groups). It denotes the extent to which different members are assigned specialised sets
of tasks to cope with their corresponding sub-environments. On the one hand, it
captures the extent to which an organisation maps onto the full diversity of its
environment through the creation of specialised individuals or sub-units at its
boundaries (Felin and Powell, 2016). On the other, it describes the extent to which
organisations give these individuals or sub-units autonomy to perform their designated
tasks (ibid). Thus, differentiation also refers to whether authority for making decisions
is centralised or decentralised in an organisation (Burton et al., 2015, Foss et al., 2013).
Organisational design scholars suggest why senior managers should delegate decision-
making authority to specialised, decentralised employees to increase the ability of their
firms to process information. If business units and their members are specialised, they
can focus more of their limited attentional resources on their area of specialisation
rather than on other responsibilities (Perrow, 1977). They are thus likely to notice
incompatibilities of action and misallocations of resource and adjust more dynamically
to changes in their external business environments (Albers et al., 2016). Delegating
decision-making authority to specialised and autonomous business units also
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economises on managers’ scarce mental resources and reduces the costs of transmitting,
receiving, and processing information (Galbraith 1974). Delegation can co-locate
decision-making responsibilities with those individual managers who possess the
necessary specialist knowledge about what decision should (optimally) be made (Jensen
and Meckling 1992). Transmitting this knowledge to hierarchical superiors may be
costly and slow. Fast-moving external environments arguably make extensive
delegation increasingly necessary as slow decision making is punished in such dynamic
environments (Mendelson and Pillai 1999, Zenger and Hesterly 1997).
As explained above, organisational design scholars identify benefits of establishing
information-absorbing units and individual specialists at or beyond their boundaries,
and giving these units autonomy to perform their information-processing tasks. Firms
that fail to differentiate their internal structures may find it impossible to respond to
fast-changing environments (Felin and Powell, 2016). However, although increased
differentiation can solve problems associated with co-locating information and actions,
it also raises the challenges of how best to coordinate those actions. The ability of
differentiated business units to share their specialised information with other parts of the
firm is often also crucial (Lenox and King, 2004; Foss et al., 2011). In other words,
firms need to integrate the information that resides in specialised individuals and teams
to achieve the shared purposes of the collective enterprise.
In this context, integration relates to the efforts undertaken by firms to ensure that their
specialised and autonomous members are coordinated and jointly contribute to overall
organisational performance (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; March and Simon, 1958;
Thompson, 1967). It relates to the extent to which an organisation introduces systems or
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mechanisms for linking together specialised or differentiated individuals or sub-units to
convert distributed information into collective intellect (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967;
Felin and Powell, 2016). Such mechanisms can include formalization devices (such as
rules, politics and procedures), lateral coordination devices (such as the use of
temporary or permanent cross-functional teams, formal committees composed by
leaders from different sub-units), or the temporary transfer of managers to other
subunits (Foss et al., 2013).
Firms that differentiate but do not integrate face the perils of organisational disorder
(Felin and Powell, 2016). Specialised and autonomous business units may be proficient
at capturing information from the external business environments but may lack the
means to transmit that information to relevant people across the business. Thus,
organisational design scholars suggest that firms should be configured in ways to ensure
that externally-captured information is transferred to relevant business divisions in a
timely manner (Tushman and Nadler, 1978). In essence, firms need to develop
coordination devices (such as cross-functional teams, liaison groups, and cross-
divisional communication channels) that ensure that information captured by
specialised units and their members is integrated in strategic decision-making. In this
sense, decentralization and coordination constitute complementary organisational
practices that are useful for efficiently accessing and deploying external knowledge in
the context of realizing strategic opportunities. We draw on this corpus of research to
explore how the differentiation and integration of boundary-spanning CPA units may




Informed by existing organisational design theory, data collection and analysis were
designed to explore how interactions between organisational design factors impact upon
the ability of CPA units to source and share political information with internal business
divisions. Our study adopts an abductive approach (Dubois and Gadde, 2014).
Abductive studies enable the extension of existing knowledge as well as the
introduction of new ideas (e.g. Habermas, 1978). They afford the flexibility associated
with exploratory, inductive research by ensuring that individual’s viewpoints
predominate and that results are grounded in data. They have the additional advantage
of incorporating theoretical frameworks in the analysis process whilst also considering
unintended observations of empirical data which can remain unclear with a deductive
approach (Dubois and Gadde, 2014).
3.3 Theoretical background
3.3.1 Research design
Our research is based on an in-depth case study focused on the UK Government Affairs
unit of Alpha Plc (pseudonym). Single case studies are often used in strategy research –
including research reported in this journal (e.g. Aspara et al., 2013; Manzini et al. 2017;
Wang et al. 2016; Vecchiato, 2019). They can provide more detailed, probing
explanations compared to quantitative approaches (Burns, 2000). Yin (2003) argues
they are the preferred approach when research – like ours – asks ‘how’ and ‘why’
questions to understand phenomena in a real-world context. Single case studies are
especially useful for examining issues that have received insufficient conceptual and
empirical attention (ibid). This point is relevant for our research. There is an absence of
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case-based studies that investigate the ‘black box’ of corporate political strategizing and
understand the configuration, processes and practices of CPA within firms (Lawton et al,
2013b).
We acknowledge that single case studies make generalisations difficult (Eisenhardt,
1989). However, the objective of our research was to explore an issue that has
previously received insufficient conceptual and empirical attention (Yin, 2003), with a
view to developing intermediate insights fit for further empirical testing with a broader
sample of firms. We also recognise that case-based research can be sensitive to
researchers’ subjective interpretations. We thus followed the advice of other researchers
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) to reduce researcher bias and increase the objectivity
of our study. We used theoretical sampling to identify and access data capable of
providing rich insights into the acquisition and sharing of political information in firms.
We used multiple researchers, external co-interpreters, and different sources of data to
increase the objectivity of our study. In the interests of transparency, we also provide
rich interview quotations to demonstrate our interpretations.
3.3.2 Choice of case
We succeeded in securing access to study Alpha’s UK-based GA unit and its
relationship with the firm’s transportation business division. Founded in the late 19th
century, Alpha is a large engineering and services company headquartered in London.
In 2018, the firm employed a staff of over 50,000 and posted revenues over £15bn –
half of which were generated by the transportation division (Alpha Annual Report,
2018). This case study context is pertinent for exploring our research questions. Alpha’s
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London-based UK-focused GA unit, composed of 3 full-time staff and an office
manager in 2019, is mandated to be the political ‘eyes and ears’ of the firm, scanning
the UK policy environment for opportunities and threats.
Whilst the GA unit operates out of Alpha’s headquarters in London, the transportation
division’s business operations are dispersed across the UK. Interviewees in the firm
indicated that the transportation division is the one most likely to be subject to
government interference. Its manufacturing processes and products are subject to close
regulatory scrutiny. Many of the division’s customers are government-owned. It also
relies on the UK government for RandD funding. In 2018 alone, over a quarter of the
business unit’s RandD expenditure was financed by the UK government (Alpha Annual
Report, 2018).
Focusing on this case-study context enabled us to hold constant several factors that
could be considered as rival explanations for any changes in the GA unit’s information-
processing activities that emerged from our data. It allowed us to interview the same
people, working in the same GA unit, monitoring the same political environment, and
sharing information with the same business division. We therefore suggest that any
changes in information-processing activities observed can be explained by changes in
organisational design factors.
3.3.3 Data sources
Following the advice of Yin (2003), our data sources included face-to-face semi-
structured interviews, publicly available archival data, and follow-up phone calls and e-
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mails. We conducted semi-structured interviews with five current and former
government affairs managers (GAMs) at Alpha between September 2016 and March
2019. One informant – the head of the UK GA unit – was interviewed seven times. All
interviewees have direct, first-hand experience of how Alpha has practiced government
affairs in the UK, both today and in the past.
Our research is partially based on GAMs’ perceptions. Perceptual data can be
problematic in terms of upward bias. Following Yin’s (2003) recommendation, we thus
used other data sources to minimise the risk of error in our research. To increase the
validity and reliability of our data, we incorporated perspectives of six senior executives
working in the transportation division and Alpha’s ‘International’ team (to which the
UK-based GAMs reported). We specifically chose to interview these people because
they have extensive knowledge and understanding of the organisation of the UK GA
unit. Informants in the business division are internal customers of the UK GA unit.
Interviews covered issues dealing with the organisation of the UK GA unit, the nature
of its relationships with the business division, and its ability to source external political
information and share it with the business division. Questions on organisational design
issues were inspired by (Foss et al., 2013). Questions on processes used to source and
share political information were inspired by Gooderham et al. (2011) who propose that
knowledge sharing in corporations involves both the accumulation and assimilation of
new knowledge in receiving units. We provide an interview guide in the appendix of
this article.
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In total, we conducted 18 interviews with key people involved in the organisation and
delivery of GA at Alpha. These generated approximately 20 hours of interview data,
capturing evolution in the organisation of Alpha’s political monitoring activities
between 2010 and 2019 (see Table 1). All interviews were transcribed verbatim. The
names of interviewees have been changed to respect guarantees of anonymity.
Table 1: Interview summary data
Interviewee Seniority at time
of first interview
Date Duration
Richard, former GAM 13 years September 2016 45 mins
Paul, former GAM 5 years November 2016 75 mins
David, GAM in Alpha’s
International division
3 years December 2016 60 mins
Catherine, head UK
Government Affairs














Amanda, head of Global
Government Affairs
2 years January 2017 80 mins




Malcolm, Senior VP Sales in
business division
9 years September 2017 75 mins
John, Senior Sales Manager in
business division
5 years October 2018 60 mins
Brian, Business Development
Director in business division
8 years April 2019 60 mins
Simon, Commercial Strategy
Director in business division
14 years April 2019 60 mins
Alan, Engineering Manager in
business division
12 years April 2019 30 mins
18 interviews, totalling 19h55m
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When we needed to clarify points made during interviews, we contacted informants
again by e-mail or phone. We also used information from public archives, including
articles and reports on Alpha’s government affairs activities published by the
mainstream and specialist public relations press in the UK, the UK government and
NGOs, such as Transparency International. This information provided additional
political, economic and corporate context for our analysis. Table 2 presents our
complete data set and explains how we used it in our analysis.
Table 2: Data sources and use
Source Type of data Use of data in the analysis
Interviews A total of 9 formal face-to-face
interviews with current members of UK-
based GR unit, conducted between
January 2017 and March 2019
Gain a deep understanding of the
organisation of the UK-based GR
unit, changes in GAMs’ working
practices, and relationships between
GAMs and colleagues in business
division
A total of 9 formal face-to-face or
telephone interviews with GAMs
working at other locations and key
contacts in the business division,
conducted between September 2016 and
April 2019
Triangulate evidence derived from
interviews with UK-based GAMs
Follow-up
contacts
21 follow-up calls with interviewees,
conducted between February 2017 and
April 2019
Obtain feedback on initial findings
Archival Alpha Company annual reports 2007-
2018
23 media reports of Alpha’s GA
activities
4 government reports on Alpha’s GA
activities
2 NGO reports on Alpha’s GA activities
Alpha’s Global Lobbying Policy
Gain a deep understanding of Alpha,
its markets, and its organisation
Triangulate evidence derived from
interviews with UK-based GAMs
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3.3.4 Data analysis
The empirical data underpinning our research captures changes in the design and
information-processing performance of Alpha’s UK GA unit over a period of nine years,
from 2010 to 2019. The temporal character of our data lends itself to a processual
analysis. Such analytical approaches are rare in CPA research (Schuler, 2002; Barron et
al., 2017). Based on the data collected and following prior studies (e.g. Skippari, 2005),
we adopted a narrative approach that included the construction of a case history. Our
analysis of this history proceeded in three stages. First, the two co-authors separately
identified temporal changes in the ability of the GA unit to capture political information
from external sources and share this information with the business division. Second, we
performed a contextual analysis to identify explanations for temporal changes in their
GA unit’s processes. This contextual analysis included an analysis of changes to the
organisational design of the GA unit. Finally, we asked academic colleagues to review
our data analysis and resolved any discrepancies in our interpretations of the data.
In analysing our data, we followed an abductive process. Accordingly, our initial
interviews were informed by concepts and notions gleaned from prior theoretical
literature, but we allowed our thematic focus to evolve as our understanding of the
management and organisation of Alpha’s UK-based GA unit increased (Dubois and
Gadde, 2014). In practice, existing research drew our attention to the broad theoretical
linkages between organisation design factors and information-processing activities in
firms and our interviews enabled us to explore specifically how these linkages – or
others – play out in the real-life setting of Alpha.
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Although our analysis was guided by existing literature, we used a system of open
coding to describe GA practice at Alpha using the language used by our informants
(Corbin and Strauss, 2015). The analysis progressed through an iterative process
whereby we invited our informants at Alpha to reflect on and revise our emerging
findings. We also asked academic colleagues to review our empirical observations. This
managerial and academic feedback enabled us to develop a richer understanding of the
factors that facilitate or hamper the ability of Alpha’s GA unit to source and share
political information and capture how GAMs at Alpha have experienced this ability in
their own social reality (Gioia, 2003).
3.4 Results
Table 3 summarizes our interview data. We structure our analysis using a narrative
approach. To establish an empirical baseline for our study, we begin by describing the
organisational design and information-processing performance of the GA unit in 2010.
We then show how the information processing activities of Alpha’s UK-based GA unit
evolved across three specific phases (phase 1 (2010-2015), phase 2 (2015-2017) and
phase 3 (2017-2018)), as a consequence of changes in the unit’s organisational design.
Changes (in phase 1) in the extent to which Alpha mapped GA unit onto the full
diversity of the UK political environment and gave it autonomy to performs its specific
tasks (differentiation) played a key role in increasing its ability to capture information
on external political developments. Subsequent changes (in phases 2 and 3) in the extent
to which Alpha introduced mechanisms to promote collaboration and coordination
between the GA unit and the business division (integration) enabled a further upgrading
of information-processing. In essence, increased coordination enabled the GA unit to
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translate political information into language that business division colleagues would
understand, and helped GAMs provide colleagues with strategic advice on how to
address political issues.




Alpha had a dedicated UK-focused GA unit staffed by one ‘all-
rounder’ manager who was highly dependent on CEO
“The GA team operated like a department of the civil service, treating
the CEO much in the same way as it would a government minister
[…] GAMs were very dependent on the CEO to pass them work to
do” (Catherine, head of GA unit)
Specialisation of
GA unit
GA unit’s responsibilities were not as specialised as they would
increasingly become over time
“I worked alone, monitoring developments across the vast number of
offices, departments and ministries around Westminster” (Catherine,







Practically no lateral linkages between the GA unit and the business
division
“I occasionally went to visit all the sites. I didn’t always quite know
what I was looking at, or what I was asking questions about, but I
went out to show my face” (Catherine, head of GA unit)
Information
exchange processes
Reactive channelling of unedited political information to CEO and
senior leadership team
“We received raw, unedited clippings from Hansard every Friday,
and sent them – unabridged – to the CEO. It was just a pile of stuff. It
added no value. What’s the point of knowing this information on a
Friday? The government might sneak something out on a Monday.
You don’t want that information on a Friday” (Catherine, head of GA
unit)
“I’d use my own contacts rather than the GA unit to keep informed
about what was going on politically” (John, Sales Manager)
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 (continued)
Phase 1 (2010-2015): Emergence of proactive search process
Autonomy of GA
unit
Increased following the appointment of a new CEO
“We suddenly had more independence. Some people actually thought
we were a bit too independent and maybe doing our own thing too
much” (Rebecca, senior GAM)
Specialisation of
GA unit
Increased following the recruitment of additional GAM and internal
division of tasks
“There was a potential muddling and lack of clarity about the UK GA
unit. It wasn’t always clear which team member was responsible for
which ministry. To avoid tripping over each other, we decided to







Increased, but still low: formal meetings between GAMs and senior
executives every 8-10 months
“Our contacts with the GA team were still not as regular as they
could have been. We were still not incorporating government affairs
early into our business planning. We needed a more concerted
integration in our sales campaigns” (Malcolm, SVP Sales)
Information
exchange processes
Emergence of increasingly proactive scanning process
“We developed targeted list of search terms, which included
technologies that were relevant to the business division, and one-off
terms that we flagged up every Thursday when parliamentary
business for the following week is announced. We used these terms to
start producing a continuous, customised feed of information from
parliament”
“The search process gave me control, as far as possible, over what
was likely to be happening in the future. Plus, it allowed me to
demonstrate that I was adding value. I could tell my colleagues about
things that were going to happen before they happened. It meant that
the company would be able to prepare in terms of what it needed to
do.” (Catherine, head of GA unit)
“The GA unit identified opportunities for us – like a state visit. They
contacted us and asked us how we could use it.” (Malcolm, SVP
Sales)
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 (continued)




“I don’t need to work through senior managers to meet the right




“Individual GAMs have individual responsibility for relationships







Increased further following recruitment of a facilitator who
encouraged GAMs to meet senior executives at least every 3 months
“The number of meetings we have can change in response to external
political developments, such as in ‘moments of great excitement’. But




Emergence of a translating process for sharing information with
business division colleagues
“I don’t just ping colleagues an e-mail about a government
announcement. I have to read it and understand what the potential
implications are for my colleagues. I translate the external
information into a simple message. ‘You need to care about this. It’s
going to cost you £5 million.’ I have to explain what the tax signified
for them’ (Rebecca, senior GAM)
“Rather than passing on Hansard clippings to colleagues, I now
spend time identifying topics important for the firm and explaining
their importance to colleagues in a language they’ll understand. It’s
not enough to inform colleagues that a certain person has been
nominated to a particular position in government. I have to explain
the consequences of that nomination for the firm.” (Catherine, head
of GA unit)
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 (continued)




“I have as much independence in 2019 as I had in 2015” (Catherine,
head of GA unit)
Specialisation of
GA unit
Remained high, following recruitment of a third GAM
“There’s now a much clearer division of labour within the GA team,
with each member responsible for monitoring developments in







Increased further following creation of dedicated taskforces created in
response to given political issues, such as Brexit
“I meet with Catherine as part of the Brexit trade taskforce at least
once a month” (Brian, Strategy Director)
Information
processing
Development of a guiding process for sharing information with
business division colleagues
“We’re moving from a ‘I think you should see this’ to a ‘This is what
we should do next’ situation. That’s when I keep adding value, when
I’m taking the pressure off colleagues. I’m saying ‘I’ve done the work
for you, you just need to agree to my suggestion, and then I’ll get on
and do it, and you don’t need to worry.” (Rebecca, senior GAM)
“I wouldn’t be able to compile risk analysis results or answer my
constant ‘so what?’ questions without the help and guidance provided
by the GA team” (Brian, Strategy Director).
Initial baseline
In 2010, the UK GA unit comprised one GAM - Catherine. She worked alone as an ‘all-
rounder’ trying to follow political developments across all ministries and departments in
Westminster. As we develop below, Catherine’s responsibilities were not as specialised
as they would increasingly become over time. The GA unit had little autonomy. It
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depended on the CEO and Alpha’s senior leadership team for instructions. Catherine
lacked discretion to make GA-related decisions herself (Richard, September 2016;
Amanda, January 2017; Catherine, April 2018). The CEO was in fact a prominent
figure in numerous politically-active trade bodies in the UK (Alpha Annual Reports,
2007, 2008, 2009):
“He had a deep, general interest in UK politics and wanted to go to
meetings with senior people in government himself” (Catherine, April
2018).
The GA unit was not well integrated with the business division. Catherine toured the
UK to visit the business division’s numerous operational sites. Despite these efforts, the
GA unit’s formal, lateral linkages with the business division were practically non-
existent. The UK GA team was simply not on most colleagues’ radars (David,
December 2016; Amanda, January 2017). Those who were aware of the GA unit
considered it a distant, isolated HQ function that worked on behalf of the CEO (John,
October 2018). GAMs sensed that colleagues in the business division saw GA as a
costly function whose utility was limited to helping secure external RandD funding
(Paul, November 2016; Catherine, January 2017). Senior managers in the business
division corroborated this perception:
“I didn’t know that the GA team existed, let alone understand how it could help
me out” (John, Sales Manager, October 2018)
Organised in this way, the GA unit’s information exchange processes were
underdeveloped. The CEO’s preference for handling political issues personally meant
that the GA unit had no information-gathering relationships within government
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departments (Catherine, March 2019). Instead, it had to rely on publicly available
information as its primary source of intelligence. Catherine captured information on
developing political issues from newspaper reports or the TV news. She would learn,
for example, that a policy document had been produced. Often, though, she had no
warning that documents were going to be issued. Each Friday, the unit received
unedited, ‘raw’ clippings from Hansard – the official register of debates in the UK
parliament. Clippings included answers to all parliamentary questions tabled earlier in
the week. Because Catherine had to follow political developments across all
government departments, she was overwhelmed by the information she received.
As she had no frequent or formal linkages with the business division, Catherine would
simply send this information – together with her summaries of media reports – to the
CEO, not to the business division. The information-gathering process was reactive and
largely unidirectional. GAMs admitted that it captured information whose utility was
not immediately apparent, neither in terms of timing of delivery not in actual content
(Catherine, January 2017). Colleagues in the business division concurred that, in 2010,
the GA unit’s ability to gather information was ‘somewhat piecemeal’ (John, October
2018). As one admitted:
“Rather than obtaining political information directly from the GA unit, I
relied on information feeds from an informal network of contacts dotted
around the country” (Malcolm, SVP Sales, September 2017).
Phase 1: 2010-2015
Between 2010 and 2015, the differentiation of the UK GA unit increased, both in terms
of its autonomy and the extent to which it mapped onto the UK political environment.
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In early 2011, Alpha appointed a new CEO whose task was to turn around the firm
against a background of numerous profit warnings and a deteriorating financial
performance (Alpha Annual Reports 2011, 2012 and 2013). In this difficult business
context, GA was not one of the new CEO’s priorities and he spent less time than his
predecessor getting involved in the firm’s political activities (Paul, November 2016).
The appointment of the new CEO led to very distinct changes in the management and
organisation of the UK GA unit (Catherine, March 2018). Crucially, it gave the GA unit
more autonomy over its day-to-day activities. In Catherine’s words:
“The new CEO and his senior leadership team were quite happy for me to
get on with managing government affairs in the way I wanted” (Catherine,
head of GA unit, April 2018)
GAMs now had more freedom to nurture relationships across Whitehall, which they
were subsequently able to use for more proactive information gathering (Catherine,
February 2019). Catherine also exploited her new-found freedom to recruit a new GAM
– Rebecca – during the summer of 2011. Conscious that she and Rebecca would
eventually ‘trip over themselves’ when seeking to capture external political information
(Catherine, February 2019), Catherine introduced a clear division of labour in the GA
unit. By 2015, Catherine was
“responsible for monitoring developments in Downing Street, the Cabinet
Office, the Treasury, Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence. Rebecca
was following policy discussions in the Home Office and the departments
of Transport, Environment and Education (Catherine, March 2019).”
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The UK GA unit has thus become increasingly differentiated: specific GAMs plugged
into the fuller diversity of the UK political environment and had autonomy to perform
their specific monitoring tasks.
Although the autonomy and specialisation of the GA unit had increased by 2015, formal
coordination between the UK GA unit and the business division remained limited.
Building on her tours of the UK, Catherine began formally presenting the work of the
GA team to colleagues in the business division. As Catherine explained:
“These presentations provided me with opportunities to start
understanding the challenges facing the business division (Catherine, April
2018).
They also helped increase the visibility of the GA unit and educated colleagues about
the importance of UK GA for the business (Malcolm, September 2017; John, October
2018). However, by 2015, these presentations were being held on average only every 8-
10 months (Catherine, September 2017). In between these presentations, members of
the GA team contacted sales colleagues in the business division on the back of monthly
sales campaign updates sent via e-mail (John, October 2018). However, GAMs were
themselves reluctant to use group e-mails or periodical newsletters to publicise their
activities, dismissing such communication channels as ‘vanity publishing’ (Catherine,
April 2018).
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Organised and managed in this way, the GA unit had by 2015 begun to develop a more
sophisticated process for capturing political information. Increased specialisation within
the GA unit enabled GAMs to collect external information more effectively. By
differentiating their roles, GAMs obtained full ownership and individual responsibility
for monitoring specific policy areas and nurturing information-gathering relationships
within specific government departments (Catherine, February 2019). Catherine no
longer felt overwhelmed by the number of government ministries and policy issues she
had to follow on her own.
Although still very much underdeveloped, formalised meetings and e-mail exchanges
with the business division helped GAMs to begin developing targeted lists of search
terms, including technologies that were relevant to the business division. To avoid being
inundated with masses of random information, GAMs used these terms to start
producing a continuous, customised feed of information coming from specific
departments in Whitehall. As Catherine shared:
“This emerging ‘no surprises’ approach to scanning the political
environment added rigour to the previous reactive search process
(Catherine, April 2017).
Senior managers in the business division appeared to appreciate the GA unit’s more
targeted scanning process. One (Malcolm, September 2017) explained that Catherine,
through her personal connections in Downing Street, had learned in early 2015 about a
state visit to London by the Prime Minister of a potential customer’s home country.
Catherine informed him about the visit, thinking he could use it to overcome an impasse
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in stalled negotiations with the customer. Thanks to the intelligence that Catherine had
acquired through her relationships, the business division was able to organise for the
Prime Minister an extensive factory visit and photo shoot with leading UK politicians
during the Summer of 2015.
“The visit worked like a treat – it concluded with the signing of a
memorandum of understanding. The GA unit’s increasingly proactive
scanning process was instrumental in finally getting the deal over the line
(Malcolm, September 2017).
Despite these advances, managers in the business division recognised that integration
issues continued to limit the ability of GA unit to share information. Whilst the senior
sales executive had welcomed Catherine’s efforts in helping him secure the deal with
the international customer, he admitted that the GA unit’s contribution to his sales
campaign had been an exception, rather than the rule. In 2015:
“Contacts with government affairs were still not as regular or formal as
they could have been” (Malcolm, September 2017).
Phase 2: 2015 – 2017
Between 2015 and 2017, lateral linkages between the UK GA unit and the business
division increased significantly. Catherine had more frequent contact with key decision-
makers in Alpha’s business divisions and corporate functions. Informants in the
business division confirmed that the frequency of these formal meetings with member
of the UK GA team had increased since 2015. Whereas they then used to see Catherine
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every 10 months or so, they now met at least once a month (Brian, March 2019; Simon,
April 2019).
“Catherine managed to broaden the bandwidth of people who were are
involved in and aware of government affairs. There was now a much more
regular drum-beat of communication between the GA unit and the
business division” (John, October 2018).
Central to this increased collaboration between the GA unit and the business division
had been the appointment in 2016 of Amanda as coordinator of Alpha’s global GA
activities. Amanda’s role was created as part of corporate restructuring aimed at
addressing duplications between Alpha’s corporate functions and business divisions.
This group-wide programme, introduced in response to heightened competition in
Alpha’s global markets, focused on simplifying the organisation, streamlining senior
management, reducing fixed costs and adding greater pace and accountability to
decision making (Alpha Annual Reports, 2015, 2016 and 2017). Charged with
streamlining GA, Amanda played a key facilitating role, encouraging members of the
UK GA unit to meet with colleagues in the business division more frequently (Paul,
November 2016; Catherine, February 2019).
“Thanks to Amanda, my personal network in the business division
expanded a lot. I had contacts and working relationships across the division”
(Rebecca, June 2017)
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Amanda was in effect the glue that had helped the UK GA unit build and bind together
its network of internal contacts (Catherine, February 2019).
The arrival of Amanda had no negative consequences on the autonomy of the GR unit.
This remained high in 2017.
“Amanda was a coordinator rather than a ‘command-and-control’ type of
manager. She never gave us direct orders, and she never expected us to
seek her permission to speak to the right people and get results” (Catherine,
March 2019).
Configured as such, the GA unit was able to hone its emerging searching process by
increasing its ability to prioritise political issues. Increased coordination with the
business division meant that GAMs now had more formal meetings with senior
executives in the business division. These, they claimed, enabled them to enhance their
understanding of what the division was doing and assisted them in compiling
increasingly specific and targeted search terms that were relevant for the business
division. For example, Rebecca explained that:
“Through more frequent and formal contacts with colleagues in the
division, I could understand that artificial intelligence and CO2 emissions
were priorities for their business. I used these two terms to skim-read
reports and evaluate whether their contents were important for the business
division or not” (Rebecca, June 2018).
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Alongside facilitating the GA unit’s ability to acquire external information, growing
coordination also enabled the GA unit to share externally-captured information with the
business division more effectively. The unit’s scanning process generated lots of
information originating from parliamentary sources and written in specific political
language. In 2010, the GA unit would simply channel this political information
unabridged to internal colleagues. By 2019, increasingly frequent meetings with
colleagues in the business division enabled Catherine and her team to better understand
the business division. Being more integrated with the business division, they could add
value by reformulating information about these developments in a language that they
knew their colleagues in the business division would understand. GAMs at Alpha
increasingly saw themselves as ‘translators’ (David, December 2016; Amanda, January
2017; Catherine, February 2018) or working in a ‘translation service’ (Rebecca, June
2017) to support the wider company.
Describing her translation process, Rebecca indicated that, when sharing information on
the UK government’s plans to introduce a new tax to members of the business
division’s training team, she had to explain what the tax signified for them, rather than
simply forwarding them the government announcement (Rebecca, June 2017).
Commenting positively on the value that GAMs’ translation process brought to the
sharing of political information, a colleague colleagues in the business division agreed
that
“The information Catherine brings is genuinely interesting and relevant.
She’s a good filter – what she communicates to us is ‘on the money’ in
terms of usefulness.” (John, Sales Manager, October 2018)
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Phase 3: 2017-2019
Lateral linkages between the UK-based GA unit and the business division increased still
further between 2017 and 2019 following the creation by Amanda in 2017 of policy-
specific taskforces. These sought to coordinate group-wide activities aimed at assessing
and minimising the effects of emerging policy issues on business operations. One of
these taskforces was established specifically to deal with the political consequences of
UK’s decision to leave the European Union (Catherine, March 2019; Alpha Annual
Reports, 2017 and 2018). Informants in both the GA unit and the business division
shared that, in early 2019, they were attending taskforce meetings on Brexit and
international trade issues at least once a fortnight (Catherine, March 2019; Brian, April
2019; Simon, April 2019). A third GAM – Ben – joined the London-based unit during
the Spring of 2018. His recruitment enabled a further division of labour within the UK
GA team.
“Ben has assumed responsibility for monitoring defence-related policy
developments. This allows me to specialise on monitoring developments
in the Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU)” (Catherine,
March 2019)
Being more formally coordinated with the business division through this Brexit-related
taskforce enabled the GA unit to identify for example, that customs and tariff issues
were becoming key priorities for the business division. Catherine was subsequently able
to use these search terms to concentrate her external scanning activities when following
developments in the Westminster machinery (Catherine, March 2019). Business-
division colleagues who participated in the Brexit taskforce commented positively about
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the GA unit’s improved ability to capture relevant political information. The unit was
now able to look through ‘the political noise’ in Westminster to identify the priorities
for the transportation division (Brian, April 2019). Moreover:
“Catherine paints a valuable global picture of UK politics and has become
a lynchpin in taskforce efforts to gather top-level and functional-level
information on very specific Brexit-related issues that matter to the
division” (Simon, April 2019).
Increased formal coordination with the business division via the Brexit taskforce also
enabled the GA unit increasingly to provide colleagues in the business division with
strategic advice on how to address political and regulatory issues. Instead of simply
informing colleagues about external political developments, Catherine and her
colleagues were progressively attempting to offer their colleagues additional
instructional guidance (Catherine, September 2017). They were in effect trying to move
from a ‘I think you should see this’ to a ‘This is what we should do next’ situation
(Rebecca, June 2018). Linkages increasingly formalised in the Brexit taskforce had laid
the foundations for more trust-based relationships between the GA unit and the business
division.
“People in the business division are now much more likely to come to us
for advice. As a team, we’re in a better place internally. The people we
work with are happy to work with us and trust what we’re trying to do.
They’re less likely now to go off and do their own thing” (Catherine,
February 2019).
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Colleagues in the business division admitted that
“We can now rely on the GA unit’s support and can count on them to
suggest what political actions need to be taken in response to Brexit-
related issues (Simon, April 2019).
3.5 Discussion and conclusion
Our research explored how firms can design the organisation of their boundary-
spanning CPA units to capture external political information and communicate it with
relevant internal business divisions effectively. We found that the information exchange
processes of Alpha’s UK-based GA unit were extremely limited in 2010 when the unit
had relatively low specialisation and autonomy and when it was poorly integrated with
the business division. As illustrated in Figure 1, higher value-adding processes
exhibiting more sophisticated ways of working emerged over time as the GA unit’s
organisational design evolved.
Following the appointment of a new CEO in 2011, the GA unit became more
autonomous and internally specialised (i.e. its differentiation increased) so that by 2015
it could focus attention on policy developments in specific government ministries and
begin scanning the UK policymaking environment in a more targeted and concentrated
manner. Following corporate restructuring in 2015 (which introduced a facilitating
manager who streamlined Alpha’s global government affairs activities), the unit became
more formally coordinated with the firm’s transportation division. Increased lateral
linkages between the GA unit and the business division meant that, by 2017, the GA
unit was able to scan political developments more proactively and translate their
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significance for business-division colleagues. Developments in the UK political
environment – including the UK’s decision to leave the European Union – led to further
coordination between the GA unit and the business division through the creation of
cross-functional task forces aimed at assessing the consequences of Brexit on Alpha’s
business operations. More frequent interactions with the business division between
2017 and 2019 enabled the GA unit not only to inform colleagues about policy
developments but increasingly offer instructional guidance on how to address those
developments.
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Figure 1: Organisational design and information exchange processes of Alpha’s UK-based GA unit, 2010-2019
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Overall, we find that GA units need to be autonomous, internally specialised and
formally coordinated with the rest of business if they are effectively to access and
deploy external political knowledge in the context of recognising strategic opportunities
and threats in the corporate political environment. These findings generate new insights
into the organisational antecedents of CPA performance, which remain understudied in
the extant literature. Over 15 years ago, (e.g. Hillman et al., 2004) reported that
corporate political actions can be influenced by factors such as a firm’s size,
dependency on government, diversification, ownership and age. More recent research
indicates that the political capital of board of directors (e.g. Sun et al., 2016) or the
configuration of top management teams to include dedicated external affairs managers
(e.g. Doh et al., 2014) have consequences for CPA performance. Our work advances
this previous research by exploring at a more micro-level how managers can make
choices about the design of business units charged with delivering a firm’s political
strategy can affect CPA performance.
Our research specifically highlights how the organisational design of a boundary-
spanning CPA unit influences a firm’s political actions. Recent, related research treats
boundary-spanning CPA units as agents of influence (e.g. Dieleman and Boddewyn,
2012; Sun et al., 2012, Barron et al., 2017). These studies emphasise the outward-facing
representational role of boundary-spanning CPA functions (Ancona and Caldwell,
1992). Complementing this research, we studied the inward-facing informational role
(ibid) of boundary-spanning CPA units, considering them as scouting units that import
information from the corporate political environment into a firm and share that
information with other business divisions. This monitoring dimension of CPA has been
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recognised by CPA scholars (e.g. Oliver and Holzinger, 2008) but insufficiently
unpacked in the extant literature.
Accordingly, a key contribution of our research is to disentangle the process of political
monitoring and cast light on the under-researched internal processes that underpin
effective corporate political actions (Lawton et al, 2013b). We illuminate an important
aspect of this ‘window in’ dimension of the CPA function: there is no single, generic
process of political monitoring. Rather, this activity can be fine-sliced into a series of
increasingly value-adding sub-processes. These involve (i) proactively searching for
company-relevant political information externally, (ii) translating externally sourced
information so that it is understandable to colleagues, and (iii) providing strategic
guidance on how to address external political challenges and opportunities.
Importantly, our research illustrates how a boundary-spanning CPA unit can be
organised in a way that supports the performance of these value-adding processes. It
does so by applying insights from organisational design theory, which has not been
systematically applied to the study of CPA. Previous studies that engage with the
organisation of CPA (e.g. Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012; Sun et al, 2012) marshal
theoretical perspectives (including resource-dependence theory and agency theory) that
encourage firms to design their CPA functions in ways that decouple GA units from the
rest of the company. Such designs may be useful whenever there is a need to buffer
firms from risks stemming from the external political environment. By contrast, our
research – adopting an information-processing perspective informed by organisation
design theory – suggests that such decoupling may prevent other business units from
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obtaining information about possible opportunities and threats that CPA units can
capture in their political monitoring activities.
Whilst our research speaks primarily to the CPA literature, it is also of interest for
scholars of organisational design. It confirms the growing corpus of work elucidating
the role of organisational design in facilitating a firm’s use of external knowledge
sources for sensing and seizing business opportunities and threats (e.g. Foss et al., 2013;
Felin and Powell, 2016). In line with this existing research, our study highlights the
need for firms to create an appropriate organisational design based on autonomy and
coordination if they wish to absorb information from external sources when innovating
or exploiting opportunities (Foss et al., 2011; Mendelson, 2000). However, building on
this previous research, our study also emphasises the importance of internal
specialisation in this process. Alpha’s UK-based GA unit was better able to control the
flow of information coming from Westminster and concentrate on which political
developments were important for the firm when it became increasingly internally
specialised.
Although not a primary aim of our research, our study also enables us tentatively to
propose possible causal mechanisms that may be useful in shedding additional light on
the observed aggregate-level relationships between dimensions of organisational design
and the exchange of political information between CPA units and business divisions.
Fundamental to the Alpha’s improved information processing activities has been the
ability of its GA unit to search the external political environment in a more targeted way.
Increased specialisation was critical in this regard. In line with the attention-based view
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of the firm (Ocasio, 2011), we suggest that specialisation positively affected the
selective attention of managers, enabling them to focus on significant political
developments in specific government ministries at the exclusion of less important
developments in others.
Our research finds that specialisation is a necessary yet insufficient factor for explaining
why Alpha’s GA unit was able to perform higher value-adding information-processing
activities. We suggest that increased integration (through improved coordination and
collaboration mechanisms) enabled Alpha’s UK-based GA function to develop a larger
network of more meaningful relationships with colleagues working in the business
division. This growing number of contacts essentially created within the firm new and
important access points (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) that laid the foundations for
exchanging information. This chimes with previous research (e.g. Barron et al, 2017)
regarding the importance of organisational design in shaping the levels of GAMs’
internal social capital in multinational enterprises.
In terms of its managerial implications, we believe our research provides senior
executives with practical guidance on the organisational mechanisms they can
manipulate to improve the performance of their firms’ political strategies. Many firms
have created government affairs units as outward-facing units for influencing and
managing political entities. However, those units may not be designed effectively to
perform inward-facing political monitoring activities. These monitoring activities are
crucial for firms to better understand the impact of increasingly complex and dynamic
regulatory environments on their business operations.
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Our research provides empirical evidence suggesting that a blend of autonomy, internal
specialisation and formal coordination is associated with higher political monitoring
performance. Being autonomous and internally specialised enhances the ability of those
GA units to proactively search the political external environment and recognise
strategic opportunities and threats. At the same time, GA units also need to be
integrated with the rest of the firm via formal coordination mechanisms. By increasing
this integration, GA units are able to translate and explain the importance of externally-
sourced political information to relevant business units within the firm, and provide
them with guidance on how to address strategic political issues. When configuring their
GA units, managers should therefore attend to those organisational design elements that
affect their firm’s ability to capture external political information and share it with
internal business divisions.
Our research suggests that senior executives provide their GA units with autonomy and
specialisation, and they should not leave the effective integration of the GA units to
self-organising principles and informal relations. Rather, they must consider putting in
place formal coordination mechanisms to help these units achieve integration with
relevant internal business units.
3.6 Limitations and future research
Our research focuses on how a boundary-spanning GA unit acts as a ‘window in’ to one
business division in one large firm operating in a particular industry and specific
political context. We acknowledge the difficulties in generating broad generalisations
from single case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989). Further research could use our study as a
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guide to investigate other GA units in different political contexts and in other different
industries. It would be especially fascinating to explore these organisational questions in
multi-divisional, multi-national enterprises whose GA units are responsible for scanning
policy for multiple business units operating in diverse institutional settings.
We also acknowledge that the boundary-spanning GA units can act as a ‘windows in’
and ‘window out’ at the same time, rather than in mutual exclusion (Ancona and
Caldwell, 1992). Notwithstanding the challenges of convincing firms to talk about their
external-facing influence-orientated activities, future research may further investigate
how changes in the design of a firm’s CPA function helps or hampers the ability of its
GA units to perform these dual roles in tandem. Thus, it would be interesting for
scholars to seek to answer: How can firms organise their CPA units to be able to
develop their monitoring- and influence-orientated processes simultaneously?
The explicit focus of our research was on illustrating how changes in the organisation of
Alpha’s UK-based boundary-spanning CPA unit led to improvements in its
information-exchange processes. We highlight the context within which organisational
changes took place, drawing attention to changes in senior management, corporate
restructuring and external policy events. However, we recognise that reasons behind
organisational design changes may be numerous. Future research could thus explore in
greater detail the effects of internal and external stimuli on managers’ decisions
regarding the organisation of boundary-spanning CPA units.
Our research also emphasises the effect of formal organisational design factors that are
much more amenable to direct managerial manipulation (Nadler and Tushman, 1997). It
98
would be interesting to investigate whether the use of these formal factors give rise to
an informal organisation, characterised by increased social relations. We thus invite
scholars to investigate the evolution of formal linkages between GA units and internal
business divisions, and explore whether these evolve into more trustworthy
relationships encouraging colleagues to establish, for instance, separate informal
meetings to discuss important political issues on an ad-hoc informal basis. Such
research would be useful in developing our still-limited understanding of trust-building
and boundary spanning in global organisations (Zhang, 2018).
3.7 Appendix. Interview guide
Questions about processing political information
 Please describe the ability of Alpha’s UK-based GA unit to capture information
on external political developments, and share this information with colleagues in
the business division
 Has this ability changed over time?
 Could you illustrate this evolution with an example?
Questions on differentiation
 How much autonomy does Alpha’s UK-based GA unit have over its political
monitoring activities?
 How has this autonomy changed over time?
 Could you illustrate this evolution with an example?
 How specialised is the UK-based GA unit?
 How has this specialisation changed over time?
 Could you illustrate this evolution with an example?
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Questions on coordination between the UK-based GA unit and the business division
 Could you please describe the mechanisms – either formal or informal – that
exist to ensure coordination between the UK-based GA unit and the business
division?
 How have these coordination mechanisms evolved over time?
 Have changes in coordination mechanisms affected information sharing between
the GA unit and the business division?
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“Often, there’s not a lot of thought given to how to structure the government
relations (GR) department […] Where GR is housed within an organization and
how it’s linked to other functions often proves critical […] Hiring the right
individuals is one key piece of the overall global GR puzzle. Another is making sure
that these individuals are fully integrated into the broader company”
Foundation of Public Affairs (2013)
4.1 The importance of designing the government affairs
function
Firms’ operations can be negatively impacted by geopolitical events. Take the case of
Airbus – the Toulouse, France-based aerospace company. The firm is affected by the
UK’s decision to leave the European Union and the election of Donald Trump as
President of the United States. Both events have introduced significant uncertainty with
respect to tax and trade policies. The impacts of such geopolitical developments are
hard to predict. But, as Airbus admits, their consequences have potential to exert long-
term negative effects on the firm’s financial performance.
This example demonstrates that the dynamics of modern business require firms to
process vast amounts of information in different corporate political environments.
Within firms, it is usually the government affairs (GA) function – also called the public
affairs (PA) or government relations (GR) function – that is charged with gathering this
political information and influencing policy. Despite its growing importance, we know
little about how to organize the GA function. A study by McKinsey found less than
30% of executives considered their GA function to be organized effectively (Musters et
al., 2013). Few scholars have examined the organizational complexities facing GA units
(Puck et al., 2018).
This study attempts to fill this managerial and research gap. We focus on the
organization of the GA unit as a boundary-spanning function (Aldrich and Herker, 1977)
performing two key information-processing activities. First, GA units can act as a
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‘window in’ to the firm. This involves monitoring public policy developments to
identify issues that have important implications for the firm. As a ‘window in’ to the
firm, the GA unit engages in compliance-based strategies to align internal business
processes with external political demands or gain advantages by anticipating future
policy developments. In this sense, the GA unit resembles a scouting unit that sources
external knowledge (Monteiro and Birkinshaw, 2017).
Second, the GA unit can act as a ‘window out’ of the firm that attempts to shape policy
outcomes. In this guise, the GA unit engages in outward-facing, influence-based actions
aimed at thwarting regulatory intrusion, or shaping how public policy is drafted. A key
way of wielding influence is through information strategies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999).
These involve providing political decision-makers with detailed information about
firms’ policy preferences. They commonly include tactics such as supplying policy
actors with technical position papers, or testifying in hearings before government bodies.
In this sense, a GA unit acting as a ‘window out’ reflects a representational boundary-
spanning unit focused on defending the firm’s specific interests vis-à-vis external
policymaking bodies.
Building on organization design theory (e.g. Burton and Obel, 2004; Galbraith, 1995),
we explain how to organize the GA unit to develop its “window-in” and “window-out”
information processing capacities. We support our arguments using insights from
interviews with individuals working in the European political landscape. We advance
knowledge about the management of government affairs by incorporating insights
drawn from organizational design theory. We provide managers with recommendations
on organizational mechanisms that can be introduced to develop information-based
political capabilities.
Our paper begins by reviewing organizational design theory. We then describe the
information processing activities of GA units. Subsequently, we identify key design
challenges that these activities involve. Finally, we provide specific advice on how to
design the GA boundary-spanning unit to overcome these challenges.
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4.2 The organizational design problem: an informational
processing view
Organizational design is the key determinant of an organization’s information
processing capacity (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Drawing on the information
processing view (Galbraith, 1974), organizational design theory sees organizations as
information processing entities, which must be designed so that information processing
capacities meet information processing requirements.
Organizations are composed of specialized and differentiated sub-units that must work
in a coordinated and collaborative way to achieve the overall goal of the organization
and process information effectively. Consequently, the organizational design problem
has been traditionally decomposed into two essential and complementary processes:
differentiation and integration (e.g. Puranam et al., 2014).
Differentiation relates to the segmentation of an organization into sub-systems, with
each one developing characteristics that reflect the requirements posed by its relevant
external environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Integration refers to processes that
ensure unity of effort amongst various sub-systems, to accomplish the organization’s
task (ibid). Integration represents the quality of the collaboration between departments
that are required to achieve unity of effort by the demands of the environment.
When applied to the organizational design of the GA unit, we contend that different
designs of the GA unit, in terms of its differentiation and integration with other internal
units, impact on the development of GA unit’s information processing capacities. The
organizational design of the GA unit will affect the behavior of its individual members
to process political information (Nadler and Tushman, 1997).
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4.3 Disentangling the information processing requirements of
the GA unit
Information processing requirements of GA units depend on the characteristics of the
activities they perform. GA units play a boundary-spanning role which establishes a
link between a firm and its external political environment and mediates the flow of
information between relevant actors in the focal organization and its task environment.
This flow of information is potentially bi-directional. In Figure 1 and below, we suggest
that boundary-spanning GA units can on the one hand perform “window-in”
information processing activities and on the other, they can perform “window-out”
information processing activities. The representational ‘window out’ and knowledge-
sourcing ‘window in’ activities of a GA unit are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Figure 1: The information processing activities of boundary-spanning government
affairs units
4.3.1 Window-in information processing activities
Window-in information processing activities consist of two information processing
activities, chiefly (i) gathering political information externally, and (ii) sharing that
information with internal colleagues
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4.3.1.1. Gathering political information externally
The boundary-spanning GA unit can be involved in external issues monitoring and
information gathering. It operates on behalf of the organization, scanning the political
environment to identify existing and future political developments that could be threats
or opportunities for the firm. This task may be complicated by information being deeply
buried in complex and unfamiliar policymaking systems. The decision-making
mechanisms underpinning the European Union (EU) provide a case in point.
Policy discussions in Brussels play out across a series of decision-taking venues,
including the European Commission, the European Council and the European
Parliament. The EU’s political institutions are in a state of flux as treaty changes shift
the balance of power across the EU institutions. In this complex and dynamic
policymaking environment, it is difficult for GA managers to determine which EU
institution is the most appropriate source of information on the many dossiers they
manage concurrently. For example:
“A lot of my monitoring work involves understanding different institutions and
recognizing for which different legal, economic and political aspects of the EU
they are responsible. We need time to train up new staff in the ever-changing
intricacies of EU policymaking, which are increasingly difficult for both
seasoned GA staff and new hires to understand.” [1]
4.3.1.2. Sharing political information internally
Even if GAMs succeed in extracting useful information from policymaking systems,
there is no guarantee they can quickly transfer that information to relevant, internal
audiences within their firms. GA units can be exposed to vast amounts of external
information that may be potentially relevant for the broader business. They need to filter
information before summarizing, translating and directing it to the business units that
need it. Otherwise, information can ‘get stuck’ in the GA sub-unit. Indeed:
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“Monitoring and forecasting regulatory developments is one thing. Translating
them into a language that design engineers will understand is another” [2]
“You might learn to know where to go and find stuff and figure out what’s going
on. But it’s more challenging to filter that information, to determine what’s
important, for which colleagues, and what they need to do about it.” [3]
In this sense, acting as a GA boundary spanner is “as much about knowing the external
political environment as it is about knowing the internal workings and demands of your
own firm.” [4]
4.3.2 Window-out influence-based activities
Window-out influence-based activities comprise two information processing activities:
(i) sharing business information with external policy actors, and (ii) gathering business
information from internal business units.
4.3.2.1. Sharing business information externally
GA units are involved in communicating information from the organization to key
external stakeholders. They control flows of political information from both the outside-
in and the inside-out. Information strategies, which involves firms providing policy
makers with information about policy preferences, constitute an effective weapon in
firms’ GA arsenals.
Information transmitted by firms to policy actors may take many forms, including
statistics, facts, arguments, forecasts, threats and commitments. Informational lobbying
can include tactics such as issuing position papers on specific policy issues, or testifying
in hearings organized by government bodies. When pursing information strategies, the
boundary-spanning GA unit needs to adapt internally acquired information so that it
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resonates with policymakers. Communicating with policy-makers and officials is
challenging. Indeed:
“There’s a load of things that need to be considered: to what extent is the
audience ‘political’, to what extent are the decision-makers a set of political
decision-makers, what else is going on in the country at the time? Do we want to
play politics when our competitors have bigger guns in their arsenal, compared to us?
What this means is that you can’t have a one-size-fits-all formula. It’s a sophisticated
activity.” [5]
4.3.2.2. Gathering business information internally
To share internal information with policymakers, GAMs need to gather it from internal
company units. GA units thus need to monitor internal company developments. They
gather intelligence across numerous business units and then ‘join up the dots’ to identify
strategic decisions that may be inconsistent with firms’ external interests. Put simply,
the GA unit can be involved in soliciting valuable information from internal business
units to obtain useful and meaningful positions on specific political issues. However,
this is by no means an easy task. Indeed:
“My internal colleagues are super busy. They don’t have the time to read a
whole policy paper. They want to read the two most important lines and hear
your recommendation.” [6]
Moreover, GAMs may be specialists in political communications, rather than technical
experts. Consequently, they may depend on expertise from internal colleagues to
participate constructively in discussions surrounding complex policy issues. For
example:
“I deal with engineering issues that require a depth of technical expertise. To
avoid giving an amateurish lecture myself, I need input from colleagues with
knowledge of these things.” [7]
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4.4 Meeting the information processing requirements
As explained above, boundary-spanning GA units perform four interrelated
information-processing activities. Our field observations reveal that performing these
activities successfully involves responding to multiple organizational challenges.
Individual GAMs may not have the necessary ability, appropriate levels of motivation
or sufficient opportunities to exchange information.
4.4.1 Ability-related challenges
One challenge is ensuring that GA units are staffed with employees with appropriate
abilities. This is not always the case. Individual GAMs may monitor political
developments blindly if incapable of understanding their business and have difficulties
judging which political developments are relevant for which business divisions. The
experiences of UK manufacturing firm PowerCorp (pseudonym) highlights this point
[8].
Historically, the firm’s UK-based GA unit was run by staff recruited from the UK’s
civil service. While skilled at communicating with politicians, they could not collect
meaningful political information. They simply gathered information reactively, looking
at media reports of policy announcements. They lacked capacities to anticipate policy
papers that were going to be issued. They shared external political information with
internal business units by forwarding them unedited press clippings. These were
difficult to digest and contained information that was not relevant for the firm.
Colleagues in the wider firm questioned the quantity and the quality of the information
received from the GA team.
Moreover, the effective sharing of business-related information with political decision-
makers may be hampered if GAMs possess underdeveloped capabilities in political
communication. The Brussels-based lobbyist of a French industrial group AltTech
(pseudonym) explained that having technical expertise does not necessarily guarantee
that GAMs can convey their messages in ways that recognize the nuances of political
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debate or appeal to the political sensibilities of politicians [9]. He participated in
numerous policy discussions during which GAMs with an engineering background
confused policy makers by using jargon and addressing issues in technical detail.
4.4.2 Motivational-related challenges
A second challenge facing GA units is ensuring that GAMs are not only skilled at
gathering and sharing political information but also willing to do so. GAMs’ desire to
perform their boundary-spanning information-processing functions can be hampered by
their motivation.
Consider again the example of the GAMs who used to work for PowerCorp. As former
public officials, they possessed a ‘civil servant’ mentality. They treated their CEO as a
government minister, and depended on him for instructions. Perceiving their role as a
largely outward-facing, HQ-focused one, GAMs were hardly motivated to engage with
or solicit information from the firm’s business divisions [10]. Similarly, GAMs working
at the Brussels representative office of the Korean group IncheonCorp (pseudonym) are
evaluated annually on the number of contacts established with actors in the European
institutions. Such staff appraisal systems barely incentivize GA executives to invest
effort in monitoring political developments or sharing intelligence with business units
[11].
We detected low levels of motivation amongst GAMs working for the UK-based GA
unit of the Japanese drugs manufacturer Zlymo (pseudonym). The firm introduced what
GAMs considered to be burdensome compliance procedures. Any internally-sourced
information GAMs needed to share externally had to pass through a cumbersome
validation process. GAMs complained that this bureaucratic procedure constrained their
reaction times to fast-paced political events [12].
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4.4.3 Opportunity-related challenges
The presence of opportunities for exchanging information represents a third challenge
facing boundary-spanning GA practitioners. The absence of such opportunities hampers
the information-processing activities of GA units. For example, GAMs at
IncheonCorp’s Brussels office lack opportunities to communicate political information
with the firm’s centralized GA unit in Korea. Communication between the Brussels
office and headquarters is ‘filtered’ by expatriated Korean intermediaries, who render
direct dialogue with headquarter colleagues more difficult [13]. IncheonCorp’s
Brussels-based representative office also has no formal connections with colleagues
working in the firm’s European subsidiaries.
The absence of opportunities to exchange information internally are especially apparent
in firms where GA units occupy peripheral positions, and may have difficulties
accessing employees in core business functions. This is particularly challenging when
core business units and senior managers consider the GA unit creates little value for the
organization, being a cost rather than a strategic activity [14]. Consequently, GAMs
have restricted access to the internal company information that they consider important
for wielding political influence [15].
Similarly, externally, GA units can lower their opportunities to exchange information
with politicians. In this vein, relations with key policy actors could be difficult to
establish or deteriorate when they fail to secure support from their senior managers in
key moments. In this regard, the Brussels-based GA subsidiary of IncheonCorp invited
the firm’s Korean CEO to meet policymakers personally to reiterate a particular policy
message. To the GA unit’s frustration, the CEO arrived unprepared for the presentation,
refused to speak in English, and almost fell asleep during the meeting [16].
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4.5 Designing effective, information-processing government
affairs unit.
Individual GA managers may not have the necessary skills, appropriate levels of
motivation or sufficient opportunities to perform their information-processing,
boundary-spanning roles. How can firms remedy these deficits? Following
organizational design thinking, we argue that high-performing GA need to be
purposefully designed and built, using a blend of organizational mechanisms. Drawing
on additional observations from the field, we prescribe a set of mutually reinforcing
organizational features that managers can introduce to help GA units build their
information processing capacities and meet their information processing requirements.
4.5.1 Recruit government affairs managers with mixed skills-
sets
Dominant frameworks in organizational design – including the multicontingency fit
model (Burton and Obel, 2004) and the star model (Galbraith, 1995) – highlight people
practices as a key dimension of organization design. Such practices are related to the
selection, staffing and training of employees to help them build skills to perform their
tasks. The skills level of an employee is the result of the accumulated knowledge
acquired before the job, which depends on the educational and professional background,
and the knowledge acquired while working in the firm, which may be fostered by
human resource policies, such as training (Burton et al, 2015).
Our research suggests that GAMs most capable of simultaneously performing ‘window
in’ and ‘window out’ activities of GA units are those possessing a mixed-skills set – one
that combines both technical and political capabilities. A GAM working for the French
manufacturing company AeroTech (pseudonym) is a chemical engineer by training. He
joined the company in the mid-2000s, working initially on operations topics, before
moving to environmental issues and most recently public affairs. This technical ability
is complemented by the political expertise the GAM has acquired in a parallel political
career. Elected the mayor of his village, the GAM also sits on the local city council.
This double competence allows him to ‘wear two hats’ – he can communicate political
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developments with ease to internal colleagues while simultaneously translating complex
business information to politicians in a language they understand [17].
Relatedly, PowerCorp have replaced the civil servants who ran its UK GA with GAMs
who have different skills-sets compared to their predecessors. They bring to the
company many years of experience gained from managing public affairs functions in
industry associations and major corporations. Unlike their civil-service-minded
predecessors, GAMs today share a business mindset based on an understanding that GA
constitutes a business-development activity that creates value for firms. Compared to
their predecessors, these business-minded recruits are more motivated to go out in the
company and make contacts, through which they can learn about PowerCorp’s specific
businesses.
4.5.2 Motivate government affairs units to process
information through greater autonomy and less
formalization
Organizational design theory suggests that autonomous sub-units are more self-
motivated to extract knowledge from external environments and then transfer it
internally (Foss and Pedersen, 2002). In traditional hierarchical structures characterized
by low levels of delegation of decision rights to employees (Galbraith, 1974), initiatives
and decisions are centralized. Firms possessing such structures do not provide
employees further down the hierarchy with incentives to identify relevant knowledge
sources effectively. Such structures may also dissuade staff from building relations with
knowledge sources.
Our interviews expose how autonomy increases motivation to process political
information. KanBanCorp, a Japanese manufacturer of industrial equipment, has
historically managed its Brussels-based European Affairs unit in a decentralized way.
The Brussels office enjoys high levels of autonomy, which motivates its GAMs to foster
linkages with colleagues working across the firm’s European subsidiaries. Through
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these linkages, GAMs can acquire internal technical information needed to contribute to
EU-level policy discussions.
A further design mechanism that can curb motivation is formalization. This relates to
the use of established set of rules or codes, written policies and standard procedures to
govern decision making (Burton and Obel, 2004). Formalization hampers individual’s
entrepreneurial behavior and reduces the motivation to look for disorganized and
difficult-to-find information in the external political environment.
Similar to the Zlymo case above, the representational activities of European government
affairs unit of Solaris Consulting (pseudonym) were subject to strict compliance rules
imposed from headquarters in Dublin. Unlike Zylmo, senior managers recognized that
standardized procedures were leading to frustration and negatively impacting how
GAM communicated the firm’s political messages in London, Brussels and Berlin.
Consequently, they relaxed formalized working practices by establishing broad
parameters within which individual GAMs should operate. Today, GAMs are more
motivated in their jobs as they only need to have their policy messages reviewed by
senior-level compliance officers when dealing with topics that have the potential
significantly to impact the firm’s global operations.
4.5.3 Create opportunities for information exchange through
lateral relations and senior management support
Lateral relations refer to direct managerial contact, task forces, cross-functional teams,
committees, integrators, and integrative departments to create coordination and
collaboration between different internal units. Such mechanisms facilitate the creation
of a social community, with shared values and goals, and the development of
trustworthy relationships among its members (Andersson et al., 2015). Our observations
from the field illustrate the beneficial effect of highly developed lateral relations on
information-processing activities.
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The Brussels-based GA unit of KanBanCorp is highly coordinated with the firm’s
marketing and RandD units, through a so-called ‘External Affairs Meeting’ and a
‘Technical and Government Affairs Working Group.’ These cross-functional teams
allow frequent interactions between GA employees and their colleagues. These
interactions have laid the foundations for a common set of GA goals and beliefs, which
guide collaboration and promote the bi-directional sharing of information. These cross-
functional teams also enable GAMs staff and their colleagues to pool technical and
political expertise to provide EU institutions with information on road safety and
environmental issues [18].
At PowerCorp, the creation of a so-called ‘Public Policy Steering Committee’ provides
members of the UK-based GA unit with opportunities to learn quickly about emerging
technological developments across the firm. This committee, which meets on a monthly
basis, is composed of members of the firm’s three major business divisions and other
corporate functions. Through these intra-firm linkages, the GA unit is aware that
information about the UK Budget is mostly relevant to the Chief Executive, the
Chairman, and members of the Executive Leadership team. Moreover, they know that
parliamentary questions on CO2 emissions are a priority for teams in the business
division working on those issues [19]. All in all, knowing the business has enabled the
GA unit to adapt its political monitoring processes to scan political developments in
Westminster in a more proactive and targeted way, and acquire political information
that is highly relevant to the firm. It also helps GA staff to identify quickly whether and
for which business divisions these political developments are relevant.
Similarly, the CEO and senior leadership team at PowerCorp are more supportive –
rather than directive – of the firm’s UK-based GA unit. GAMs see considerable benefit
in having this C-suite support. It sends a message to the rest of the company about the
importance of GA. The CEO and members of the senior leadership team are in effect
internal ‘champions’ of the GA unit. Senior-level support gives GA a ‘license to
operate’ in the firm and encourages colleagues in other business units to share
information GAMs.
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4.6 Discussion and conclusions
Political information is a key resource in response to geopolitical dynamics and
uncertainties. However, it is usually deeply buried in complex political systems and
hard to access. Moreover, it is often difficult for managers to understand the
implications of political information for value creation. How a boundary-spanning
government affairs unit is designed is crucial to developing an awareness of political
issues and building responsiveness capacities.
We propose a set of organization design mechanisms which, combined, provide a
‘recipe’ (see Table 1) that managers can follow to create opportunities for exchanging
political information within their firms, and enable and motivate GA practitioners to
monitor and influence political developments more effectively.
First, GA units should be staffed by individuals possessing both technical and political
skills. Second, these individuals should be able to work autonomously, and not
overburdened by bureaucratic processes. Finally, they should be integrated with the
broader business through cross-functional teams, and be supported by senior executives
in the firm. Our research builds on existing CPA theory. Few studies explore how
organizational structures and practices of a firm influence its CPA performance.
Responding to recent calls (Puck et al., 2018), our study casts light onto the
organizational complexities associated with the management of boundary-spanning
CPA units.
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Table 1: Recommendations for organizing GA units in response to information-processing challenges
Challenges of meeting information
processing requirements
Information processing requirements affected
Recommendations (mechanisms)




















GAMs have difficulties judging which political
developments are relevant for internal business
units
x x x
Staff GA units with GAMs possessing mixed
skills-sets





GAMs have low motivation to engage with or
solicit information from internal business units x x
Provide GA unit with greater autonomy
Reduce formalization (i.e. reduce use of
standardized procedures and compliances
rules)
GAMs have low motivation to look for (and






GAMs lack access to employees in internal
business units x x
Integrate the GA unit through promoting the
creation of lateral relations (cross-functional
teams or committees)
Ensure that senior executives support and
show interest in GA activities
GAMs have difficulties accessing/ maintaining
communication channels with policy actors x x
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Our research has limitations. Evidence presented to illustrate our argument is taken
from the European context. Future research could usefully corroborate our findings
across different policymaking arenas. Our study also stresses formal organizational
design factors that are amenable to direct managerial manipulation. Further research
could explore the rise of more informal organizational forms – such as organizational
cultures – on the boundary-spanning activities of information-processing GA units.
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General Conclusions and Avenues for Future
Research
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Based on our findings discussed in the chapters above, the general conclusion of this
thesis is that, when managing CPA, the organisational design of the units in charge of
delivering information-based political activities do matter. Precisely, this thesis focuses
on exploring how managers can purposefully organize their firm’s CPA units in ways
that enable them to effectively monitor the political environment by acquiring external
political information and disseminating it to internal business units (i.e window-in
boundary spanning activities) and to disseminate relevant internal information to
external policy-makers to influence shape policy outcomes (i.e. window-out boundary
spanning activities).
In answering this research question, the findings reported in this thesis offer several
contributions to existing CPA research. Theoretically, responding to recent calls (Puck
et al., 2013), the findings contribute to CPA scholarship by exploring and delineating
organisational-level antecedents of CPA performance that remain understudied in the
current literature. Drawing on an information-processing view informed by
organisational design theory and a boundary spanning approach to CPA, this thesis
shows how different managerial interventions to organise the GA function can improve
the firm’s CPA performance (Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton et al., 2013) by enhancing
their GA unit’s information-processing capacities.
Chapter 2 deepens our understanding of the mechanisms underlying the effect of
different organisational designs factors on CPA performance, with a specific focus on
influence-based strategies. The study takes GA subsidiaries of large MNCs as the unit
of analysis. It shows that when the GA subsidiary have high levels of autonomy and
high level of coordination with other internal business units, the GA subsidiary is able
to develop better relationships in terms of quantity and quality with internal business
units. Interestingly, this level of relationships, or social capital, help them, in turn, to
build better relationships with external policy makers, thereby providing GA units with
greater scope for influencing their decisions. This study thus contributes to recent
research that treats boundary-spanning GA units as agents of influence, emphasizing
primarily the outward-facing influence-based strategies (e.g. Ancona and Caldwell,
1992; Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012; Sun et al., 2012; Barron et al., 2017)
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Chapter 3 complements chapter 2. Rather than focusing on antecedents of outward-
facing influence-based CPA, this chapter explores the inward-facing CPA monitoring
processes of the GA unit and their emergence as a consequence of changes in
organisational design. Moreover, and in line with chapter 2, this study adopts an
information-processing perspective to CPA activities, as contributors to value-creation
to their companies (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). In so doing, it complements previous
studies (e.g. Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012; Sun et al., 2012), informed by other
theoretical perspectives, such as resource-dependence theory and agency theory, which
put their emphasis on how to design the GA unit with the main purpose of protecting
the company from political risks. These previous studies suggest that firms implement
buffering-based organisational strategies, by decoupling the GA unit from the rest of the
company. In stark contrast, chapter 3 suggests that GA units needs to be highly
coordinated and integrated with other business units. It also finds that GA units need to
be highly specialized in terms of political environments and on the political issues they
are dealing with, and that they need to have autonomy to respond in timely manner with
changes in their external environments. Configured in this way, the GA unit is
consequently able to create value to its company by monitoring effectively their
political environments.
Importantly, this chapter also contributes to the existing literature by further elucidating
and unpacking the value-adding sub-processes underling the monitoring/window-in
dimension of CPA. The study shows that these sub-processes positively evolve from (i)
proactively searching relevant information externally to the company (ii) to being able
to translate this externally sourced information into a language that can be useful to
employees working in the firm’s internal business units, and finally (iii) to providing
strategic guidance to these units on how to deal with external political threats and
opportunities.
Chapter 4 takes a broader view than the two previous chapters to give recommendations
about how to organise the GA unit to be able to monitor and influence the political
environment simultaneously. To do so, this chapter conceptually disentangles the main
information processing activities of the GA unit and their intrinsic information
processing requirements. Consequently, applying insights from organisational design
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theory, it argues and prescribes the organisational design mechanisms that can be put in
place to meet these information-processing requirements. This chapter exposes that
high-performing GA units, being able to both monitor and influence the political
landscape, need to be designed and built using a blend of mutually-reinforcing
organizational mechanisms. First, these units should be staffed by managers with mixed
skills-sets. Moreover, executive managers should give GA units high levels of
autonomy and support, and help them build lateral relations with other business units.
Thus, by conceptually disentangling the key activities and the information-processing
requirements of the boundary-spanning GA unit, this chapter contributes to the CPA
literature by exposing important, organizational antecedents of the firm’s value-creating
political strategies.
This thesis responds to calls for more research providing managers with practical
guidance (e.g. Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004), especially on the levers that they can
pull to manage the organisational complexity of their firm’s GA units more effectively.
Thus, several recommendations for practitioners can be proposed from this thesis.
These are especially relevant when GA units work in information-based political
environments, such as the EU. As the main claim, this thesis suggests that managers
should move away from the more traditional view of managing their GA units as being
just the façade of the company, usually organised in a decoupled way and with limited
connection to the rest of the company. Instead, this thesis prescribes that GA units
should be highly integrated with the rest of the business units. This integration could be
achieved through implementing coordination mechanisms, such as cross-functional
teams. Also this thesis encourages managers to give the GA unit both the necessary
support and autonomy. This will allow the GA unit to focus and respond to the
informational changes on their highly dynamic political environments with a high
degree of independence and self initiative. Finally, as argued in chapter 4, the effect of
the previous mechanisms could be further enhanced by staffing the GA unit with
individuals with mixed (both technical and political) skills-set.
This thesis is thus mainly based on conceptual and exploratory studies. Their findings,
arguments and limitations may prompt several avenues for future scholarly enquiry.
First, one clear limitation of these exploratory studies is the generalizability of the
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results. This thesis draws on observations in a limited set of organisations, industries,
and the specificities of the European political landscape. Future studies could support
these findings by focusing on GA units operating in other political landscapes, such as
the U.S., and in other industry sectors. In this line, and more interestingly, future studies
could explore the organisational tensions and challenges of organising the GA function
of the large MNC. In this case, rather than focusing on a single GA sub-unit or
subsidiary, as the unit of analysis, scholars should consider the GA function of the
entire MNC as a whole. This unit will be thus composed of different GA sub-units or
subsidiaries, operating in different political environments.
Finally, organisational design scholars have been recently interested on the rise of
informal organisations (e.g. Clement and Puranam, 2018) - such as organisational
cultures, informal relationships and the different dimensions of social capital between
individuals or units (e.g. relational/trust, cognitive alignment) - as a consequence of the
implementation of different formal organisational designs. Chapter 3 is clearly a
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